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   4Preface 
This publication is part of a series which was established in 2001 in order 
to make available teaching and learning material specifically for European 
Studies programmes throughout South Eastern Europe. The series makes 
public the results of research projects conducted in the framework of the 
“Network for ‘European Studies in South Eastern Europe” which is one of 
the major undertakings of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. The 
Network was founded in January 2000 and now comprises almost 40 uni-
versities and institutes both from South Eastern and Western Europe. It 
aims at establishing and strengthening interdisciplinary European Studies 
in the region by 
•  holding yearly conferences in the countries of the region 
•  organizing working groups on different topics 
•  giving advice in curricula development 
•  sending a Flying Faculty for teaching at European Studies Centers 
•  holding Train the Trainer seminars 
•  establishing Regional European Studies Centers 
•  providing a database of all programmes in the region, and 
•  publishing teaching and learning material. 
These activities are mainly financed by the German national budget for the 
Stability Pact, in close cooperation with partners like the German Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the German Rector’s Conference, the German Aca-
demic Exchange Service and the Hertie Foundation.  
Several publications of the series like this one have been designed as Read-
ers. The goal is to support European Studies programmes in the region with 
easily accessible, academically profound literature on those topics of the 
European integration process, which have a special relevance for the re-
gion. The philosophy is based on the dual experience that only very few 
faculties in South Eastern Europe have sufficient literature on European 
  5integration at all and that if they have such literature it reflects predomi-
nantly the West European viewpoint. Thus, there is a need for a new kind 
of literature, duly reflecting the needs and the experiences of the region. 
The guiding principles for these Readers are as follows: 
•  The topics chosen are of major future importance for the region.  
•  Only topics with relevance for the region as a whole are selected. 
•  Renowned, trans-nationally respected experts are chosen as authors. 
•  Authors are asked to concentrate on basic knowledge for M.A. level.  
•  The Readers are designed for professors and students alike for prac-
tical use in seminars. 
•  The goal is to get authors from all countries of the region. 
•  The Readers are available for free on the Homepage of ZEI 
http://www.zei.de/ for downloading.  
The Readers all have the same format: They start with a text written by a 
well-known West European author. The text is selected by a distinguished 
South East European author who then offers a response reflecting the ex-
perience made in the region, some didactical questions which might be dis-
cussed in class, and finally a list of basic literature.  
While there is a thorough review process for each publication by the two 
editors, the Reader nevertheless reflects exclusively the views of the au-
thor. We hope that these texts will contribute to a better understanding of 
the European integration process among the young generation in South 
Eastern Europe and to a more substantial dialogue among scholars from the 
region and from EU countries. 
 
Dr. Rafael Biermann        Prof.  Dr.  Holm 
Sundhaussen 
Zentrum für Europäische       Osteuropa-Institut der Freien 
Integrationsforschung, Bonn       Universität Berlin 
  6Liam O’Dowd and Thomas M. Wilson 
Frontiers of sovereignty in the new 
Europe 
Border changes in the “new” Europe
1 
There are many versions of the new Europe. The one which most concerns 
us is the new Europe of the changing European Union (EU) which is 
transformed every decade or so through expansion or further integration. 
But the formal process of EU-building has no monopoly on “newness“. 
Other new Europes include those of the post-Soviet Central and Eastern 
Europe, the new right of the Western European welfare states; the Europes 
of youth, of global consumer and popular culture, of new immigrants and 
asylum-seekers, or the Europe of those elites who increasingly see the 
continent as an economic space which can act as a powerful competitor to 
North America and East Asia. All of these Europes are interrelated – they 
find expression in the themes of state sovereignty, transnationalism and 
cultural adaptation which are central to a social science struggling to come 
to terms with a period of dramatic flux and transition. This volume’s case 
studies of politics and society at and beyond the borders of the EU seek to 
demonstrate that international borders are key vantage points from which to 
view the processes of building and redefining the states, nations and 
transnational networks which comprise the new Europe. 
 
1  Reprint, slightly adapted, with the friendly permission of the authors. The article 
was first published as an introduction in Liam O’Dowd / Thomas M. Wilson (eds.), 
Borders, Nations and States, Aldershot 1996, pp. 1 – 17. 
  7In many ways, of course, the study of borders reminds us that there is much 
of the “old“ in the “new“ Europe. Borders, after all, are reminders of the 
past – they are “time written in space“
2, the product of previous conquests, 
invasions, population movements or treaties. Any redefinition or 
transformation of borders means engaging with the past. The coining of 
slogans and catchphrases such as a “Europe of the regions”; “a Europe 
without frontiers” or “fortress Europe” each in their own way raises 
questions of how the past is going to be reconciled with the present and 
married to the future. A “Europe of regions” has meant in part the 
rediscovering of the outlines of old states and nationalities long suppressed 
or subsumed within the inter-state system created in Europe over the last 
one hundred and fifty years. The slogan of the Single European Market, a 
“Europe without Frontiers”, implies, in the first instance, a radical altering 
of the economic significance of state borders within the EU. Finally, 
“fortress Europe” raises the perennial question of where Europe’s external 
borders are to be drawn while recalling the many versions of this border 
which we have inherited from history. 
It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that over the last decade borders have 
become increasingly the focus of political, popular and scholarly attention. 
The issue of borders is one of definition and construction. In our view, the 
term “borders” includes both the legal borderline between states and the 
frontier of political and cultural contest which stretches away from the 
borderline. The frontier zone is by our definition much wider than the 
political line in the sand which demarcates state sovereignty, because it 
encompasses the economic, social and political landscape of borderlands’ 
people. This frontier transcends the borderline, and its width and depth 
within each state can best be determined through the understanding of 
border people’s behaviour and beliefs. As we suggest, the study of borders 
in the new Europe includes both the geographic spaces contiguous to the 
borderline as well as the boundary line itself. Some small European states 
 
2  Rupnik, J. 1994, Europe’s new frontiers: remapping Europe. Daedalus 123 (3); 91-
114, p. 103. 
  8may even be borderlands in their entirety as they are demarcated on all 
sides by other states’ borders. 
Although the borders of Europe today are undergoing a series of 
transformations, it is not the first time this century that European borders 
have been at the centre of radical political and social change. In fact, the 
continent is currently experiencing its third major phase of border 
reconstruction this century. The first two phases followed the ending of two 
world wars and were at the disposition of a coalition of the victorious 
states. The current phase which dates from 1989 is somewhat different. It is 
not the outcome of an all-embracing inter-state war. No victorious states 
stand ready and willing to impose a “new world order” of national states
3. 
Although regional wars play a substantial role in Eastern Europe, to 
understand what is happening at and to borders we must look more to long-
term processes of economic, political and cultural change rather than to 
single and often cataclysmic events such as wars, invasions and major 
peace settlements. 
Two somewhat contradictory processes appear to be at work in Europe. In 
the past, many existing national boundaries are being delegitimised and, in 
some cases, violently challenged and redrawn. In the EU, on the other 
hand, it seems that internal (member-state) boundaries, while remaining 
largely unchanged,
4 are being devalued in the wake of the Single Market 
and the Maastricht Treaty. Events in the former USSR and Yugoslavia 
appear to confirm the new salience of borders and the powerful attraction 
of a bounded homeland for ethno-national groups. EU developments, on 
the other hand, seem to suggest the opposite, i.e., the diminishing 
significance of national borders, and by extension, the decline of the 
national state in a core region of advanced capitalism. 
Such a contrast may be superficial, however. It obscures the 
interconnections and similarities between east and west as shown in the re-
 
3  Ibid, p. 94. 
4  It is worth pointing out that there have been two substantial changes to the national 
borders of EU states sind 1945, the incorporation of Saarland into West Germany 
and the re-unification of East and West Germany. 
  9unification of Germany, the re-emergence of Central Europe and the 
debates over the nature and boundary of “fortress Europe”. Pressures exist 
for a form of “balkanization” or “regionalization” in western Europe also. 
These pressures exist even in long-established states such as the United 
Kingdom
5, Spain
6 and Italy
7. Benedict Anderson
8 has argued that this 
tendency to fragmentation may be seen by future historians as a long-term 
process of disintegration of the “great polyethnic, polyglot, and often 
polyreligious monarchical empires built up so painfully in mediaeval and 
early modern times”. He traces this process from the American revolution 
through the collapse of the Spanish Empire (1810-1830), the fall of the 
Hohenzollern, Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman empires after the First 
World War and the period of decolonisation and “proxy wars” in many 
parts of the “Third World” after 1945. 
Attempts to resist this disintegration have had mixed origins and results. 
They include Hitler’s failed attempt to unify Europe under German 
domination, the collapse of a communist world order under the leadership 
of the USSR, and the rather more ambiguous attempt to integrate ”Europe” 
under the umbrella of the European Community (EC), now the EU. The 
latter is caught between two contending pressures: towards “ever closer 
union”, on the one hand, and towards dissolution or dilution by extension 
on the other. With the collapse of state socialism in eastern Europe, one of 
the main historical rationales for the EU, as a US-sponsored bulwark 
against the other major Cold War superpower, the Soviet Union, vanished. 
Advocates of European unity, on the other hand, see at least two alternative 
rationales: the long-term processes of global re-integration which are 
driven by economic and cultural globalization and the emergence of huge 
 
5  See chapters by O’Dowd and Corrigan and Wilson (eds.), Borders, Nations and 
States, Aldershot 1996. 
6  Letemendia et al. 
7  Strassoldo, R. (ed.) 1973. Boundaries and regions. Trieste: Edizioni and Strassoldo, 
R. and G. Delli Zotti (eds) 1982. Cooperation and conflict in border areas. Milan: 
Franco Angeli Editore. 
8  Anderson, B. 1992. The new world disorder. New Left Review 193, 3-13, p. 3. 
  10politico-economic trade blocs centered on North America and Japan. Their 
argument is that Europe, to compete, must unite. 
The task of “building Europe” is difficult, however, given the history of 
internal diversity and warfare within Europe, and the lack of external 
threat. As Therborn
9 observes “the unifying Other outside has been distant, 
weak or nebulous”, whereas “the divisive Other within has been close and 
strong, in many cases stronger and closer than in other parts of the world”. 
In most current debates over the future of the EU, enthusiastic advocates of 
a supranational EU see the national state (and its attempts to preserve 
national sovereignty) as the main “Other” of an integrated Europe. From 
this perspective, in the absence of a major and coherent external threat, the 
main opposition to a more integrated Union comes from within, from the 
jealously guarded sovereignties of its own member states. 
The “Other without” and the “Other within” immediately raise the problem 
of borders and borderlands. In other words, where will Europe’s external 
borders rest and, more importantly, will they enclose a “fortress Europe” or 
one which encourages links with “non-Europe”. Alternatively, do the 
borders of member states and their own internal regional borders reflect a 
fragmentation or diffusion of sovereignty in the EU, or are they part of a 
restructured hierarchy of authority. These questions are adressed in a 
variety of ways by examining the development of cross-border cooperation 
across the external and internal borders of the EU, the re-appearance of old 
regional and ethno-national frontiers encouraged by transnational networks 
and the extent to which state (and EU) sovereignty is compromised or 
reinforced by the management of issues such as the environment, security 
and illegal immigrants. 
Three propositions underlie the following chapters: (1) the old lack of 
coincidence between nations and states in Europe is manifesting itself in 
new ways in response to economic, political and cultural change; (2) 
boundaries are key demarcations of state sovereignty and its relationship to 
 
9  Therborn, G. 1995. European modernity and beyond: the trajectory of European 
societies 1945-2000. London: Sage, p. 244. 
  11the EU; (3) the border policies of the EU and what happens at the internal 
and external boundaries of the Community can reveal much about the 
current status and future prospects of the national state and the European 
Union. 
A spectrum of social scientific interpretations can be constructed on the 
basis of these shared propositions. At the extremes, these involve 
contrasting notions of the importance of national borders and, by extension, 
of the state sovereignty which they de-limit. At one end of the spectrum, 
the new fluidity, permeability and transcendence of territorial boundaries is 
emphasized. In this view, the globalization of economic and cultural life, 
the revolution in mass communications, the increase in both elite mobility 
and mass tourism and the alleged transition from modernity to post-
modernity all seem to devalue national boundaries both as markers of 
collective identity and of relatively self-contained and self-governing 
societies. A potential weakness of this approach is that it is forced to 
ignore, or to discount, the renewed salience of the politics of borders and 
identities in both Western and Eastern Europe. Within this perspective 
much of the research and theorizing on the globalization of economic life 
has stressed the mobility and increased flexibility of capital and the loss of 
the national state’s economic influence. New forms of capitalism involve 
spatial differentiation enhancing multi-national strategies, regionalization 
and localization at the expense of state strategies
10. 
Applied to Europe, this analysis suggests that the EU is a recognition on 
the part of national governments that they can no longer effectively control 
a capitalist order characterized by the competition between large trading 
blocs, the global strategies of multinational corporations and financial 
markets. In a capitalist world system based on “free-trade”, policy options 
open to national states are limited and they are forced to join in 
supranational blocs in order to establish economies of scale and gain 
competitive advantage. The Single European Act (1986) and its slogan a 
“Europe without Frontiers” represented the EC’s response to competition 
 
10  Harvey, D. 1989. The condition of postmodernity. Oxford: Blackwell. 
  12from North America, Japan and the Far East. A revived neo-classical 
economics argues that borders are an impediment, a support for 
protectionism (at least within trade blocs) which hinders market forces and 
the maximization of prosperity. 
Theorists of cultural globalization, such as Robertson
11, pay even less 
attention to the question of territorial boundaries. While recognizing the 
objective importance of economic and political inter-connectedness as a 
dimension of globalization, Robertson stresses the emergence of a global 
consciousness and a subjective and cultural dimension to globalization 
which is not based on the building blocks of the inter-state system and 
hence transcends territorial boundaries. Post-modern theorists such as Lash 
and Urry see global inter-connections less as structures than as flows. They 
argue that national structures are being replaced by immense transnational 
flows of capital, money, goods, services, people, information, technologies, 
policies, ideas, images, and regulations across national border. In this view, 
national governments have diminishing control over activities within their 
territorial boundaries because of global money markets, huge transnational 
corporations, new communications technologies and new forms of “sub-
politics”
12. This “hollowing out” of the nation-state implies a radical 
diminution in the significance of national boundaries. 
The “post-modern social order” does not necessarily involve the 
disappearance of territorial boundaries. It may actually lead to their 
proliferation and, consequently, to the relativization of all borders, 
especially those defining the national state. It becomes possible to 
contemplate, therefore, the proliferation of nationalisms and of new ethnic 
and regional sub-territories which float free of the sites of economic and 
political power. Baumann
13, for example, argues that the durable marriage 
forged by the “nation-state” between the ethnic and the political nation is 
 
11 Robertson,  R.  1992.  Globalization: social theory and global culture. London: Sage, 
p. 183. 
12  Lash, S and Urry, J. 1994. Economies of signs and space. London: Sage, p. 28. 
13  Baumann, Z. 1995. Life in fragments: essays in postmodern morality. Oxford: 
Blackwell, p. 247. 
  13now on the brink of divorce. Within the new Europe, it is no longer as 
necessary as in the past for prospective states to pass the “sovereignty 
tests” of economic, social and even military viability. These functions are 
now uncoupled and diffused to a wide range of transnational and 
subnational agencies. The result, according to Baumann
14, is that the 
ongoing erosion of national sovereignty is allowing the forces of ethnicity 
to roam free and uncontrolled, no longer trammeled by the burden of 
economic and social management. In this scenario, there is a proliferation 
of ethnic, military and economic borders, which overlap, co-exist with, and 
diminish the primacy of national state boundaries. 
This image of border flux and volatility is captured well in a British 
magazine’s supplement to a Channel 4 programme, “Borderlands”. 
Referring to Europe, the authors observe: 
As frontier-fixity dissolves, no neat pattern of region and/or nationality seems likely 
to replace it. Reality is outpacing theory. The feuds of to-morrow are likely to be 
far more various than has been anticipated: state-nations, long-buried nationalities, 
immigrants, new regional identities and rising city states are all jostling for 
houseroom inside the new Europe and its expanding outer rim
15. 
Many political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists are less ready to 
write the obituary of the national state, however
16. At the other end of the 
spectrum of approaches to national sovereignty, they question the 
somewhat kaleidoscopic picture of borders, border disputes, and the 
emergence of embryonic national borders within existing states as evidence 
that nationalism and struggles over national sovereignty have retained their 
significance. Analyses of the alleged retreat of the state can still conclude 
that it retains immense resources and “an infinite capacity for external and 
internal adaptability” while remaining for most citizens “a primary source 
of welfare, order, authority, legitimacy, identity and loyalty”
17. The main 
 
14 Ibid. 
15  Jones, D. and Platt, 1992. Introduction. New Statesman. Borderlands Supplement 
19 June, p. 2. 
16  see, for example, Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell; 
Anderson, B. 1992. The new world disorder. New Left Review 193: 3-13. 
17  Muller, W. and Wright, V. 1994. Reshaping the state in Western Europe: the limits 
to retreat. West European Politics 17 (3): 1-11, p. 10. 
  14potential weakness of this approach is that it fails to address adequately 
how underlying processes of economic and cultural globalization are 
restructuring (perhaps even diminishing) national sovereignty and the 
borders which delimit it. 
One of the more durable priorities of states remains the monopolization of 
the legitimate means of coercion within fixed territorial boundaries
18. To 
this Tilly
19 adds two further reinforcing element: the monopoly of taxation 
and access to credit (for expenditure on soldiers, arms and other means of 
war). The post-1945 settlement in Europe left national borders secure for a 
time, but did not prevent erosion “from within”, from secessionist 
movements, disaffected regions and ethnic minorities. One explanation is 
that many Western European states moved from relying on mass legitimacy 
to emphasizing the control and surveillance of their populations
20 at the 
same time as they were advocating giving full rein to free-market forces. 
Arguably this process of control was even more marked in Eastern Europe, 
albeit without free-market capitalism. Nevertheless, the roots of 
destabilization can be seen in the treatment of minorities such as the 
Basques in Spain, Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland, the playing off of 
one nationality against another in Tito’s Yugoslavia, and the attempt to 
place a wall around Eastern Germany’s experiment in state socialism. 
Tilly
21 has even argued that governments became more unstable as their 
borders became more secure. Not for the first time, state authorities begin 
to see whole populations as enemies (e.g., ethnic or religious minorities) 
which means that civil wars can generate huge refugee problems, 
frequently at or near borders. Widening the scope of the argument to EU 
level, it is worth asking if the lack of an external and threatening “Other” 
creates space for movements such as the neo-fascists and neo-nazis to 
 
18 Weber,  M.  1978.  Economy and society. G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds.) London: 
University of California Press, p. 56. 
19  Tilly, C. 1990. Coercion, capital and European states AD 990-1990. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, p. 85. 
20  Giddens, A. 1985. The nation state and violence. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
21  Tilly, ibid, p. 203. 
  15victimize illegal immigrants, gypsies, and other marginalized groups within 
the EU. 
Of course, national boundaries themselves are rooted in coercion, in 
practices of forcible exclusion and inclusion. Border construction has 
seldom been a matter of popular democracy. Instead, it has been typically 
the result of the progressive incorporation of localities, through military 
conquest, invasion and colonization interspersed with periods of 
negotiation, secret manipulations and treaty-making. In other words, 
international boundaries are the outcome of state-building. Durable states 
have been able to develop ever more elaborate institutions and more 
intensive regulation of everyday life. They have been able to mobilize, to a 
greater or lesser degree, forms of collective identification with both the 
trappings of state power and with the “nation”, which the state purports to 
represent or which it may even have created. Only in recent times, and in 
some places, however, has the political representation of bounded national 
territory taken a democratic form. 
More detailed studies of what is happening to borders and borderlands can 
reveal much about the forces impinging on the changing nature of the 
national state and national sovereignty. In the context of the European 
Union such studies can also provide clues to the complex processes of 
European integration. As Wallace
22 observes: “the question of boundaries 
is central to any study of political systems, legal jurisdiction, or economic 
or social interaction.” 
Borders, nations and states 
A variety of social scientific perspectives informs our view of the 
relationships between nation and state at the internal and external borders 
of the EU. In his critique of the new myth of a “Europe without Frontiers”, 
 
22  Wallace, W. 1992. Introduction: the dynamics of European integration. In W. 
Wallace (ed.) The dynamics of European integration. London: Pinter, p. 14. 
  16the Swiss geographer Raffestin
23 insists that borders are a necessary 
constituent of social life. He argues that they perform four functions, 
translation
24, differentiation, connection and regulation. These functions 
suggest a dynamic social process which, in the case of stable geographical 
boundaries, becomes frozen in time. Max Haller
25 has noted the several 
meanings attached to the terms “borders” and “limits” in a number of 
European languages. He detects behind this variety a fundamental double 
meaning
26. On the one hand, borders may be seen as ends or barriers, on 
the other as passages, filters or gateways between systems contiguous to 
each other. This dual meaning is similar to the long-standing distinction 
made by political geographers between boundaries and frontiers – a 
distinction traced by Sahlins
27 as far back as thirteenth century France 
when the monarchy began to distinguish between boundaries (definite lines 
marking the limits of its jurisdiction) and “frontiers” which were zones 
which “stood face to” an enemy. Historically, frontier or border regions 
including those between nation-states have been the site of conflicts over 
territory and are frequently characterized by different ethnic, religious, 
linguistic or national composition than that of their respective national 
states – a reminder of the lack of coincidence between national boundaries 
and other socio-cultural boundaries. 
Historically, the allocation and demarcation of borders has been an elite 
phenomenon where some degree of force or threat of force is usually 
present. This has meant the forcible inclusion and/or exclusion of several 
 
23  Raffestin, C. 1993. Autour de la fonction sociale de la frontière. Espaces et 
Sociétés: Identités, Espaces, Frontières, 70-71; 157-164. 
24 By “translation” Raffestin (ibid, p. 159) means the territorial expression or 
indication of the wishes and power of those creating the border. While Raffestin’s 
approach is somewhat abstract and functionalist in orientation, he does point to why 
borders may be a necessary constituent of social order. 
25  Haller, M. 1990. The challenge for comparative sociology in the transformation of 
Europe. International Sociology 5 (2): 183-204, p. 201. 
26  see also Strassoldo, ibid. 
27 Sahlins, P. 1990. Natural frontiers revisited: France’s boundaries sind the 
seventeenth century. American Historical Review 95 (5): 1423-1451, p. 1425. 
  17minority ethnic groups or parts thereof. As Hansen
28 observes, “all the 
European countries created in the last 150 years have border region 
problems arising from the demands of minorities seeking to realize their 
‘national’ values within the framework of an organized state”. Thus the 
drawing of national borders in Europe has led to the construction of 
national minorities many of them located in frontier regions. Of course, 
national boundaries or the states they enclose cannot be understood merely 
in terms of elite manipulation or the capacity to coerce. Donnan and 
Wilson
29, laying out an agenda for an anthropology of frontiers, point out 
that borders are “continuously negotiated and re-interpreted through the 
dialectics of everyday life among all people who live at them, but also, to a 
lesser extent, by those who cross them, and by those people within a state’s 
border who feel in contact with or threatened by outsiders.” 
The chapters by Dressler Holohan and Ciechocinska and Driessen
30 
underline the role that national borders can play in the everyday life of 
borderland people. Although in each case they deal with external frontiers 
of the EU in Upper Silesia and at the Spanish-Moroccan border zone, 
cross-border interaction is very different in each place. The EU’s border 
seems far more open to Poles of German nationality than it is to 
Moroccans, despite the latter’s strong historical links with southern Spain. 
In itself this provides clues to the way in which EU identity is being shaped 
in conjunction with two different kinds of national identity and state 
formation in Germany and Spain. As Wilson
31 points out, borders are social 
constructions which are the products of interaction between powerful 
European and national elites, on the one hand, and people at borders, on the 
other hand. 
 
28  Hansen, N. 1981. The border economy: regional development in the southwest. 
Austin: University of Texas Press, p. 20. 
29  Donnan, H. and Wilson, T.M. 1994. An anthropology of borders. In H. Donnan and 
T.M. Wilson (eds.) Border approaches: anthropological perspectives on frontiers. 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, p. 11. 
30  Liam O’Dowd / Thomas M. Wilson (eds.), Borders, Nations and States, Aldershot 
1996. 
31 Ibid. 
  18Drawing on anthropological literature, Grosby
32 argues that nation-states 
have been able to draw on transcendental, primordial patterns of attachment 
which people in all societies (both pre-modern and modern) have to their 
homeland. He observes that “throughout history man [sic] has considered, 
albeit with variations, environments which are considerably more extensive 
than those of the family or home to be his ‘own’, hence integral to his 
life”
33. Bounded territories in this view are not simply a matter of control or 
access to resources, or of networks of interaction within fixed geographical 
limits, rather they denote participation in a collective consciousness 
(rituals, customs, traditions, laws, historical knowledge, and even language) 
associated with a particular territory. Territorial borders are thus sacralized 
typically via nationalism as is shown in the “willingness of millions of 
Europeans this century to sacrifice themselves for a land and country they 
believe to be their own”
34. 
In sociological terms, therefore, it is as necessary to draw on Durkheimian 
as well as on Weberian perspectives to understand the combination of 
coercion and sacralization which underpins national boundaries. Of course, 
collective consciousness also includes the existence of a collective, if 
selective, amnesia, about the origins of borders, which can be a major 
resource for national institutions and powerholders. Identification with a 
particular bounded national territory is strengthened to the extent that the 
memory of shared sacrifice (in war, for example) and inclusion in the 
nation overrides memories of exclusion, exploitation and coercion which 
have attended the creation of borders. The prevalence of these latter 
memories often distinguish border regions from the rest of their respective 
states. 
The political and cultural dimensions of national borders are continually 
confronted, however, by the universalizing thrust of economic 
 
32  Grosby, S. 1995. Territoriality: the transcendental, primordial feature of modern 
societies. Nations and Nationalism 1 (2): 143-162. 
33  Ibid, p. 144. 
34  Ibid, p. 143. 
  19development. Hansen
35, for example, notes that both “growth pole” and 
modern location theory stress the disadvantages that border regions 
experience because political boundaries “represent artificial barriers to the 
rational economic organization of potentially complementary areas and 
because both public and private sectors tend to avoid investing in areas 
where conflicts are likely to arise”. The pioneers of modern location theory, 
Christaller and Losch, assumed that in the case of borders, politics are 
detrimental to economics and that the political goals of the nation-state are 
inherently detrimental to border regions. For Christaller, border areas are 
likely to be subject to the “socio-political separation principle” where the 
“authority of stately and sovereign might” takes precedence over the 
“rationality of economic principles”
36. O’Dowd and Corrigan’s chapter
37 
supports Christaller’s argument in the case of the UK-Irish border, despite 
the precedence given to economic development in border areas by the EU 
in the wake of the Single European Market. 
Indeed, the rationality of economic principles was precisely the means 
employed by the founders of the EU to desacralize the historically volatile 
pattern of European national borders – lines that were reforged in the wake 
of the excesses of territorial nationalism in two world wars, and before that, 
in the long struggles between European powers in the course of imperialist 
expansion overseas. Europe has never had settled boundaries, and the 
borders of what might constitute Europe remain contested today
38. Only ten 
states (the largest being Spain) had the same boundaries in 1989 as they 
had in 1899 – “the nation-states which constitute Europe are themselves 
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  20almost all imprecise entities with moveable boundaries”
39. Germany, at the 
geographical centre of any definition of Europe, has had particularly fluid 
boundaries. In many ways the recent unification of Germany underlines the 
point. Austria, Alsace, Silesia (discussed by Dressler Holohan and 
Ciechocinska below), Bohemia and several other regions testify to the 
contingency of German boundaries and the implications of a citizenship 
regime which continues to be based on jus sanguinis rather than jus soli
40. 
For the founders of the EU, however, a stabilized pattern of national 
boundaries was a necessary pre-requisite (what some saw mainly involving 
the containment of Germany) to generating patterns of economic 
interdependency which would eventually reduce the significance of 
existing borders, thereby permanently removing the threat of inter-state 
wars over territory. This strategy was pursued, however, along with a 
considerable growth in the economic, administrative and cultural capacity 
of the state. The new forms of total war had shown the mobilizing potential 
of the nation-state. Translated into peace-time, this potential manifested 
itself in the growth of what Mann
41 has termed the “infrastructural power 
and penetration of the state”. Within infrastructural power, he includes the 
power of regular taxation, a monopoly over military mobilization, 
permanent bureaucratic administration, a monopoly over law-making and 
enforcement, the capacity to store an enormous amount of information, and 
influence over the economy. 
More importantly, in the context of this volume, Mann also argued that 
growth in infrastructural powers also increased “territorial boundedness”, 
thus strengthening the boundaries of existing states. Tilly
42 links the growth 
of “infrastructural powers” with the homogenizing strategies of state rulers. 
As the state’s sphere of operations expands beyond its military and law and 
order functions, it begins to employ direct rule and intervention in the 
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  21everyday lives of its population. This can mean, imposing, inter alia, 
national languages, military service, a legal, welfare and educational 
system, even systems of economic regulation. Citizenship rights are 
deepened as the population can make claims on the state while sharing 
certain duties and obligations to state rules. Tilly
43 argues that from the 
1850s onwards there was a substantial growth in the rule-making role of 
the state: “the welfare, culture and daily routines of ordinary Europeans 
came to depend as never before on which state they happened to reside in.” 
The differentiation and regulation functions of national borders were 
underlined as states introduced passport controls, employment permits, 
tariffs and customs as part of economic policy, began to distinguish 
foreigners within the state as worthy of closer surveillance and more 
limited rights. 
Standardization of state rules and of the rights and obligations of various 
categories of people represented a form of social homogenization. In 
reflecting on the long rise of the nation-state in Europe, Therborn
44 points 
out that it involved a major ethnic homogenization within state boundaries, 
especially in the East but also to some extent in the West. This 
homogenization, however, seldom went far enough to ensure a co-
incidence between the boundaries of state and nation. Furthermore, 
although the infrastructural powers of states developed substantially after 
1945 with the growth of welfare and education systems, the tendency 
towards intra-state homogenization was now being challenged. Western 
Europe was changing from its historic role as a source of emigration to 
becoming an area of net immigration. Old sub-national, ethnic and regional 
boundaries showed that they could be politically re-activated given the 
appropriate socio-economic, political and cultural conditions. 
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  22Immigration has become a major issue for most western European states
45. 
Driessen provides an anthropological insight below into the plight of North 
African immigrants at one point of entry to the EU. Immigration threatens 
some groups of citizens with increased competition for resources and also 
threatens the process of homogenization to which national identity is so 
closely linked. In arguing the case for open borders, Carens
46 recognizes 
that most people reject the idea on the basis that “the power to exclude 
aliens is inherent to sovereignty and essential for any political community”. 
Here the connections between national borders, sovereignty and identity 
are manifest. Carens
47 goes on to argue that the moral and philosophical 
case in favor of restricting citizenship, especially to “third world migrants”, 
is weak: “citizenship in western liberal democracies is the modern 
equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited right that greatly enhances 
one’s life chances”. 
Western European wealth and dominance, once linked to, and frequently 
dependent on, outward migration as part of imperial and colonial 
expansionism, is now protected by restricting or denying EU entry to 
migrants from the ex-colonies of the major EU states
48. At the core of the 
debates over EU borders is how the western European “inheritance” is to 
be protected, who should share in it and who should be excluded. Here, 
there is a trade-off between constructing common controls at the EU 
borders and the diversity of citizenship rules and controls which exist 
among the member states. EU activities directed at standardizing 
immigration and asylum controls have been criticized by human rights’ 
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  23advocates for being secretive and democratically unaccountable
49. In this, 
however, they are squarely in a long tradition of border creation in Europe. 
EU borders’ policies 
Despite the attempts of many European states to strengthen or maintain 
their sovereignty at borders, the EU’s drive to greater economic and 
political integration has complicated these efforts. Evolving border policies 
within the EU have been shaped by three overriding considerations. The 
first two seem at first to be contradictory: the abolition of border controls in 
order to promulgate the “four freedoms” of movement for capital, goods, 
services and labor, and policing and security. The first suggests the 
transcendence and porosity of borders, the second leans towards their 
maintenance and consolidation. Underlying all borders’ policy is a third 
consideration, the potential threat posed to state sovereignty by the lack of 
coincidence between nation and state. Advocates of a federated “Europe of 
the Regions”, which allows subnational groups more freedom of 
expression, see “ever closer union” as the means of circumventing existing 
states without confrontations over territorial borders. On the other hand, 
proponents of a looser “Europe of the States” insist on inter-
governmentalism as a means of preventing the emergence of independent 
regional voices and international regional alliances which might pose an 
alternative to the existing inter-state system. 
The abolition of internal border controls marks a significant 
acknowledgement of the weakening infrastructural power of the national 
state arising from the globalization of national economies and the lost of 
state influence over production and over financial markets. With the 
growing multinational control of the global economy, states lost much of 
their power of initiation, if not of regulation. Singular national economic 
interest became more difficult to define, despite the pressures of the 
Brussels’ bargaining tables. Disparities and conflicting interests began to 
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  24grow between regions and economic sectors within states
50. These 
conditions prepare the ground for shifting some elements of economic 
regulation to the EU level as a way of influencing the continental strategies 
of multinational corporations. At the same time, by passing economic 
responsibility upwards, states can attempt to undermine the delegitimizing 
potential of radical economic restructuring and mass unemployment. 
The Single European Act (1986) and its compelling, if somewhat 
misleading, slogan “a Europe Without Frontiers” provided a huge stimulus 
to European integration. Between 1986 and 1992, the European 
Commission issued almost 300 directives eliminating physical, fiscal and 
technical barriers to the Single European Market
51. Significantly, however, 
national states were given the responsibility for implementing these 
directives, thus allowing considerable scope for the exercise of national 
sovereignty and discretion in the long and difficult process of removing 
internal border controls (i.e., economic and security checks)
52. Majone has 
identified what he terms “the rise of the regulatory state” in the EU. Thus 
although the Single Market may have rendered borders more porous by de-
regulation, re-regulation is also occurring which is carving out new roles 
for the national states within their own boundaries through the 
implementation of directives emanating from Brussels. The Single 
European Market provided the impetus for the Maastricht Treaty and its 
three-stage programme for closer economic and monetary union combined 
with its tentative steps in the direction of closer political union. 
The abolition of border controls changed the context for existing regional 
cross-border cooperation and encouraged the formulation of a positive 
programme for border regions. As all member states had border regions 
with problems of adaptation to the new economic regime, this facilitated 
inter-governmental agreement to include a special initiative on border 
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  25regions (INTERREG 1 and 2) within the wider framework of the expanded 
Structural Funds. INTERREG opened up new opportunities for regionalists 
and federalists to test the limits of national sovereignty by building on 
cross-border networks
53. It also potentially accorded more space to regional 
and ethnic groupings keen to carve out more areas of economic and 
political activity in which they would have a greater degree of autonomy 
from the constraints of existing national borders and inter-state 
relationships. 
The new proactive EU borders’ programme was a belated response to the 
work of the consultative Council of Europe on borders over a thirty year 
period. The latter sought to develop a triangular borders’ policy involving 
cooperation between European institutions, national states and border 
regions. From the 1950s onwards a tradition of cross-border cooperation 
had been developing along the Rhine Axis on the Dutch, German, Belgian, 
French and Swiss borders
54. These attempts were central to the formation 
of the Association of European Border Regions which was to later become 
involved in monitoring the EU’s INTERREG initiative. The Council of 
Europe continued to stimulate interest and research on border areas and 
cross-border cooperation
55 and promulgated a Framework Convention on 
Transfrontier Cooperation in 1981 which advanced new models and 
juridical principles for cross-border links. However, this Convention had 
little practical effect as the EC/EU remained divided on the precise nature 
of the links between economic integration and national sovereignty. 
INTERREG, which was specifically designated for internal and external 
border regions, had a dual purpose: to help integrate the economic space of 
the Community as a whole and to address the negative legacy of border 
areas, i.e., their isolation from the main centres of economic activity and 
decision-making, the separation of their commercial centres from their 
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  26natural hinterland, their inferior infrastructure, their generally poor natural 
resources, and the specific difficulties arising from having different legal, 
administrative and social welfare systems, and often different languages 
and cultural traditions, from their contiguous region across the border
56. 
Overviews of cross-border cooperation, research at borders and EU 
assessments of the INTERREG programme raise a number of key issues 
about the changing nature of national boundaries and their durability. 
Border regions vary widely in terms of their origins, longevity, 
permeability and history of cross-border contacts, both formal and 
informal. Moreover, despite suffering in general from the negative 
economic effects of their marginal location, they nevertheless vary in terms 
of their potential accessibility to the core regions of economic activity in 
the EU, and in terms of the immediate benefits to be gained from cross-
border links. Internal border regions closer to the geographical and 
economic centre of the EU may benefit economically to a greater extent by 
the abolition of internal borders under the Single European Market
57. 
Finally, the external borders of the EU face additional problems of possible 
consolidation with the deepening of EU economic integration and the 
widening of the economic and demographic gaps between the EU and its 
Eastern European and Mediterranean neighbors
58. 
EU borders’ policies are in flux, caught between forging links across the 
external border and policing it. Signs of internal challenges to the bordered 
sovereignty of member states co-exist with the dynamic and moveable 
nature of the EU’s external borders. The re-unification of Germany, the 
recent incorporation of Sweden, Finland and Austria into the EU, 
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  27negotiations for Cypriot and Maltese membership, and German support for 
the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia illustrate the current 
dynamism of EU borders. Attempts to accelerate the process of creating a 
common borders’ policy through the Schengen agreements have proved 
very troublesome to implement and have created new distinctions between 
citizens from EU states belonging to Schengen, those from non-Schengen 
EU countries, and those who are from non-EU countries
59. 
Behind the current “official” borders of the EU, new informal borders are 
emerging, creating new “frontier” or “buffer” zones. As the Oder-Neisse 
line becomes more porous, the informal EU border is pushed towards 
Poland’s eastern borders. Likewise, there are signs that as the Austro-
Hungarian border becomes more permeable the Hungarian-Romanian 
border is being fortified with EU assistance. These “proxy” borders reflect 
the long-term strategy of the EU and of its major power-centre, Germany. 
If there is to be a “fortress Europe” its eastern line has yet to be settled. On 
this border, small states like Slovenia are seeking to reconcile their new 
national autonomy with an EU whose general inter-state rules promise to 
keep large states from arbitrarily controlling their smaller and weaker 
neighbors. Open borders with the EU, as Mlinar points out in his 
contribution to this volume, do not necessarily mean less autonomy. 
The Norwegian-Swedish border currently marks the northern limits of the 
EU but here once again the official and informal borders may not coincide 
in the long-term, at least to the extent that the old Nordic links are 
maintained across the external EU border
60. To the South, the 
Mediterranean countries are getting EU assistance to fortify their maritime 
borders against immigrants. Despite the historic inter-penetration of 
Southern Europe and North Africa, today the latter seems to lie firmly 
outside the EU. As Driessen notes below, Morocco’s admission for 
membership got scant attention as it was deemed not to be a European 
country. Similarly, Turkey’s application for membership has been put on 
the long finger, although it straddles Asia and Europe. In the South, the 
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  28Mediterranean, once the maritime core of a “world economy” before the 
rise of north-west Europe, is now akin to a moat between rich Europe and 
the poor Afro-Asian continents. Within the EU itself a band of poorer 
peripheral regions including southern Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece acts 
a further “buffer zone” for the dynamic capitalist core economies, as do the 
post-socialist central European countries. 
Clearly, the buffer and border zones of the EU remain “under 
construction”. With the end of the “Cold War”, the eruption of ethno-
national border conflicts in the Balkans, and the shrinking of Russia to its 
seventeenth century boundaries, the designation of “Europe’s” external 
borders has become much more problematical. While the EU lays claim to 
be the foremost carrier and shaper of European identity, this claim can still 
be contested by European states which are not members. 
The problem of defining Europe’s borders and identity remains as 
formidable as ever. As Pieterse
61 suggests, the Islamic and non-white 
peoples are pressed into service to define “Europe’s Other”. Old fault-lines 
between Orthodox and Western Christianity and between the old lands of 
the Ottoman Empire and the rest, have begun to take on new meaning. 
Borders and borderlands throughout Europe are being re-sensitizsed in a 
variety of ways. For the moment, even the advocates of a unified Europe 
have veered toward emphasizing the exclusionary role of borders. Their 
dilemma is well summed up by the fear expressed by a journalist who is 
also a supporter of the Single European Market. In an article entitled: 
“Open borders have their limits”, he observes that “building a non-
exclusive Europe is equivalent to constructing a home without doors or 
windows. Pretty soon there will be nothing worth having left”
62. 
Borders, like the nations and states they circumscribe, are Janus-faced. 
They look inwards as well as outwards; they are inclusionary as well as 
exclusionary. It is clear that the disposition of borders in the new Europe is 
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  29far from settled, nor is it clear how functions and meanings will be 
apportioned to different types of borders within and without the EU. What 
the contributors do convey, however, is the existence of a sense of 
transition and change, even if European integration is more easily 
understood as an ongoing process rather that a set of outcomes. Crucial to 
the understanding of this process is an appreciation of the ways in which 
frontiers are zones of contest over sovereignty. It is here too that the 
changing nature and meaning of national sovereignty may be most 
transparent. 
Borderlands manifest the ways in which inter-state and state locality 
relationships have been formed. Both sets of relationships are fundamental 
to the formation of a “new Europe”. Historians show us how the 
delimitation of national borders often results from great events such as 
wars, conquests and treaties. Social scientific approaches, while 
acknowledging the centrality of such events, reveal national borders to be, 
like European integration itself, a form of social process. This process is 
bound up with the interaction between power, coercion, citizenship, 
political representation and identity. In the long-term even great historical 
events can be read as expressions of this interaction. While the EU is likely 
to remain the decisive actor in shaping the new Europe, it is too early to 
judge the nature and location of its external border or to assume that its 
abolition of internal border controls will be permanent. It seems clear, too, 
that its borders’ policies will continue to be shaped by its most powerful 
member states. The study of borders and frontier zones can reveal much 
about the dialectic of fragmentation and integration which is currently 
reshaping the European continent.
  30 
 Borders in Europe 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of the socialist 
system, international debate has focused on the emerging nature of a 
possible “new world order”. In particular, the question which arises now 
regards the precise nature of this “new world order” and who will 
participate in this global arena. 
Recent times have witnessed dramatic global transformations. Until 1989 
the political landscape was characterized by two superpowers opposing 
each other in the Cold War, whereas now the academic community 
searches for new potential super and regional powers. Christian Hacke 
regards the United States of America as the only world power and he holds 
the opinion that Washington is therefore condemned to be a world power.
1 
Equally, former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt currently considers 
the United States of America to be the only superpower.
2 However, he also 
defines China, Russia, India and Brazil as countries that have the potential 
to be superpowers in the near future.
3 
When we speak of new superpowers in the near future we have to ask 
ourselves what the role of Europe will be. Does Europe have the capacity 
to become a superpower in the future? Indeed, Europe can play a role in 
world politics. Not, however, in the form of single national states but in its 
entirety. The European Union has to reach a stage where it possesses the 
capacity to act in a much more unified manner. This is especially the case 
with respect to its foreign policy.
4 However, nowadays the European Union 
is confronted with a host of challenges. It will have to tackle unprecedented 
challenges such as the widening and deepening of the Union. 
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  32When speaking of Europe we have to keep one important fact in mind. 
Europe is not synonymous with the European Union. Not every country in 
Europe is automatically a member of the European Union, which means 
that we have to differentiate between the two. Nevertheless, many scientists 
and politicians do use the two terms interchangeably. One term is used for 
both because many people in Europe identify with the European Union 
regardless of whether their country is a member of this body or not. 
Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission, supports the 
view that the new world that has emerged after 1989 has brought new 
problems and exacerbated old ones.
5 The European Union now has to deal 
with new challenges such as the accession process of the European Union – 
and also with old problems, for example those of the member states with 
respect to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
The European Union, which started as the European Economic Community 
in 1957 with six members, today numbers 15 members while 13 candidates 
are waiting to join. These 13 candidates are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, 
the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey. On the 31
st of March 1998 
accession negotiations commenced with Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Estonia and Slovenia. In December 1999 the European 
Commission invited a further six countries to start accession negotiations, 
namely Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and the Slovak 
Republic. In Copenhagen in December 2002, ten of them were invited to 
join the Union. So far, Turkey is the only country the European 
Commission has not started accession negotiations with.  
The changing Europe is confronted with a multitude of challenges. The 
issue of European borders is one of the most controversial ones. In this 
essay we will try to answer some questions concerning national boundaries 
in Europe, such as: What is the function of borders? Do we need borders in 
the future? And is there a difference in the perception of borders in Western 
Europe and in Southeastern Europe?  
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  33The importance of borders in Europe 
In the English language there are four expressions that correspond to the 
term “Grenze” (German) or “frontière” (French): The first one is that of a 
frontier. This can be seen as an open, moving, onward frontier behind 
which lies no man’s land.
6 The second expression is that of limits, which 
stems from the Latin word ‘limes’. Limits was originally used in the sense 
of barbarian limits, that is to say, the limits between one’s own civilization 
and the unknown barbarians. The third expression is that of a border. It is 
used in the sense of modern state borders, which separate equal nation 
states. The last expression is that of a boundary. This is an all-embracing 
concept of system boundaries. In this essay, we will use the expression 
borders because the topic we are dealing with is that of modern state 
borders. 
On the whole, borders tend to be disliked due to the fact that they separate 
people from each other. Looking at the history of Europe, we will see that 
borders have always separated people into different parts. One half of a 
nation lives in the eastern part of the border and the other in the western 
part. It was especially the Iron Curtain, which symbolized the extreme 
separation among people of the same nation living in two different systems. 
In this sense, we can call the Iron Curtain an ideological border, which 
persisted until the peaceful revolutions of 1989.
7 
Many border lines in European history were arbitrarily drawn. However, 
none of them was so arbitrarily drawn as the Iron Curtain and the Berlin 
Wall of 1961, which separated the Germans into two different parts.
8 The 
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  34Iron Curtain was not the first border to divide one nation into two parts but 
it was the first one in Europe to divide them due to its insuperability.
9 
The example of Germany has demonstrated that ideological borders are 
particularly unacceptable to the people who were subject to them. The 
Berlin Wall divided whole families for almost 30 years. Compared to 
nation state borders, ideological borders are of an inhuman kind. Therefore, 
the change of borders in Europe today and in European history is not 
comparable with the abolition of the Iron Curtain in 1989.  
Analyzing the situation in Europe after 1989, we can ascertain that two 
events occurred concerning borders: ”The borders inside the European 
Union lost their importance whereas Central and Eastern Europe saw the 
birth of a multitude of new state borders.”
10 
The significance of borders within Europe changes from time to time but 
they never lose their importance entirely. Throughout history, starting in 
1648, Europe has been characterized by frequent border alterations. 
Traditionally, the Peace of Westphalia is regarded as the starting point of 
the modern European state system. This peace treaty restored the old rights 
of the imperial estates, outlined the German emperor’s regional cessions to 
France and Sweden and defined the future denominational position and 
responsibilities of the imperial authorities within the empire. The 
denominational regulations of the Peace of Westphalia bear a principle that 
still affects our time. The rule “cuius regio, eius religio” had stated that the 
populace of a given realm had to adopt the religious belief of its ruler. With 
the Peace of Westphalia, this principle received an important extension. 
The denominational status quo of the bishoprics and their seizing (feudal 
possession of an estate in land) was calculated in relation to the average of 
the year 1624 and frozen. Since then, the distribution of the denominations 
in Germany has hardly changed. Subsequently, religious quarrels were 
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  35settled diplomatically in Parliament by the denominational bodies of the 
corpus catholicorum and evangelicorum.
11 
After the French Revolution (1789) and the Napoleonic Wars (1806-1813) 
it was the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), which redrew the political map 
of Europe. Although the territorial changes brought about by the Congress 
of Vienna did not endure long on the whole, they represented a practical, if 
not always equitable, solution and an attempt at dealing with Europe as an 
organic whole. The Quadruple Alliance and the Holy Alliance, designed to 
uphold the decisions of Vienna and to settle disputes and problems by 
means of conferences, were an important step toward European co-
operation.
12 
Since 1815, European state borders have changed several times with the 
next important date being World War I (1914-1918 ). World War I and the 
Russian Revolution reshaped the European state system, giving rise to new 
states such as Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, and Yugoslavia.
13 However, not only did new states 
arise; others were extinguished altogether or subject to severe change of 
their territorial shape: The Baltic countries lost their independence. 
Romanian Bessarabia became the center-piece of the new Soviet republic 
of Moldova. Germany was divided and the borders of several other 
European countries, such as Poland, were changed. 
World War II then once again redrew the borders in Europe profoundly. 
However, now the new borders remained very stable up until 1989. This 
time period, the Cold War, was one of the longest periods in Europe of 
territorial stability. The reason was the impermeability of European borders 
between the two blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This ideological 
border persisted for almost 45 years due to the Cold War. The countries of 
Eastern Europe did not have the opportunity for significant reform, for 
instance of their borders, without the permission of the Soviet Union. With 
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  36the collapse of the Soviet Union the period of being controlled by the 
Soviet Union stopped abruptly. The ideological border crumbled. But with 
it not only did the Iron Curtain vanish. Also, the former Union republics of 
the Soviet Union became independent states in 1991, just as the Czech and 
Slovak Republics in 1993. Yugoslavia fell apart to form Bosnia, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Slovenia and remaining Yugoslavia. 
Considering the amount of negative experiences regarding European 
borders, it is nowadays not surprising that they are not liked very much by 
the people who suffered from them. It was especially the time during the 
Cold War with its ideological borders that separated the people. Therefore, 
borders are regarded with antipathy because they separate territories and 
people from each other, define nations and frequently have been the source 
of international conflict and war. In this way, separation in general 
highlights all kinds of differences such as political, social, economic, and 
cultural ones.
14 
Just as there are negative perceptions about borders, there are also positive 
ones. It is believed that borders are necessary for countries and the people 
living within them. Enclosure fosters a feeling of security and people prefer 
to live in secure and familiar circumstances. Ulrich von Alemann holds the 
opinion that we need borders to preserve our identity. He also gives the 
example of the former East Germany. Shortly before reunification with 
West Germany, borders of the old five “Bundesländer” were reconstituted 
within the GDR. People obviously feel a need to live within borders that 
facilitate orientation and identification.
15 Everywhere where borders have 
been removed new ones have to be created, no matter whether this happens 
in Germany, in Eastern Europe or in the former Soviet Union. Keeping this 
in mind, borders have to be understood as boundaries enclosing a space of 
identification and orientation. 
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  37When analyzing borders in Europe, we have to note that the topic of 
borders is an interdisciplinary one. Therefore, it would be suitable to look 
at what, for instance, geographers think about borders: 
”For many geographers the landscape was an important element to prove the 
unity of the nation and its boundaries. Boundaries must be natural, that means 
they must be proven by the geological and geographical circumstances. In 
practice, natural also means defensible. This way of thinking would lead to 
what at the end of the 19
th century would be called geopolitics; a word taken 
from the Swede Kjellen, who used it for the first time in 1899. He used the 
term to define the branch of geography which was engaged with the political 
borders.”
16 
Another discipline which demonstrates an interest in borders is history. 
However, looking at the point of view of historians, we can determine that 
within history the subject was widely neglected during the 19
th century. 
Historians were preoccupied with the nation state and its political history. 
This led to an interest in developments in the political centre and not with 
those located at the periphery: 
“Not only for frontiers and boundaries, but also for border regions no interest 
existed. Of course, after 1871 interest remained in France in the history of the 
lost territories, Alsace and Lorraine. But this interest was more a defense of 
legal national rights (Lepage 1845) than an interest in the particularities of the 
transition area between two countries, that had suffered and would still suffer 
as a glacis, a field of fire between two antagonists.”
17 
Functions of borders 
Looking at the political map of Europe, we can ascertain a multitude of 
borders. Today, countries are divided by borders, which were mostly drawn 
after conflicts and wars. The borders in Western Europe were redrawn for 
the last time after World War II and the ones in Eastern Europe have been 
realigned since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, borders 
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  38between the two blocs were drawn on the basis of ideology. They served to 
protect one’s own ideology from opposing ones. It was especially the 
Soviet Union, which was afraid that the other socialist countries, like 
Poland or Hungary, could be influenced by capitalist ideas. Therefore, the 
borders between the two blocs were highly salient. In addition, the borders, 
especially on the eastern side, were strictly controlled. Thus, borders had 
the function of maintaining and protecting one’s own ideology.  
However, after the end of the Cold War the function of borders between 
Western and Eastern Europe changed. During the Cold War it was 
especially the Berlin Wall, which became a most notorious symbol for the 
ideological divide. Until 1989, the borders of the individual countries 
within the socialist block were not very significant. Of importance was the 
Iron Curtain in its entirety, which symbolized the separation of the two 
blocs. 
Borders also served as boundaries between religions. Borders have played 
an important role not only regarding the relationship of Christianity and 
Islam but also among Roman-Catholic and Orthodox Christians.
18 The 
function of the borders between Christianity and Islam from the 15
th to the 
17
th century was to keep Islam (i.e. the Ottoman Empire) at distance from 
Western Europe. During this period military conflict was frequent between 
the Ottoman Empire and the Western powers. It was the aim of the 
Ottoman Empire to expand the influence of Islam in Europe. Some 
centuries ago it was Christianity, which tried to expand its influence in the 
East by means of the crusades commencing in the 11
th century. Therefore, 
borders historically had the function of blocking the expansion of Islam in 
the Christian world and vice versa.
19 
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  39National borders delineate the territories of states. Hans Knippenberg and 
Jan Markusse hold the opinion that the functions of borders are derived 
from those of states
20 Their functions may be summarized as follows: 
-  exercise of military power, 
-  management of the economy, 
-  construction and maintenance of national identities, and 
-  provision of a welfare state.
21 
From the 17
th century onward, European states have gradually acquired the 
above functions, which have subsequently taken the lead as justifications 
for territorial statehood without erasing the former ones. Since the 19
th 
century, the formation of nation states has enormously increased the 
volume of functional activity of states and has extended their influence and 
activity up to the boundaries of state territories.
22 Especially after World 
War II, many formerly expansionist states were transformed into more 
saturated ones. Their war departments were re-structured into defense 
departments. They renounced the use of war to expand their territory. As a 
result, international borders have never been as stable as in the second half 
of the 20
th century. At the same time, the geopolitical situation in Europe 
changed. This had consequences for the military function of state borders 
in Europe. The fact that NATO and the Warsaw Pact separated Europe 
strengthened the military function of the borders between them and 
diminished this function within them.  
After 1989, due to the geopolitical upheaval, the military function of 
borders changed once again. After the Warsaw Pact dissolved, several 
former East Block countries applied for NATO membership. This truly 
marked the end of the Cold War. The importance of the military function of 
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  40borders declined, at least in Central Europe (much less in South Eastern 
Europe).
23 
A similar situation pertained to the economic function of the borders. After 
1945, Europe was divided into two political-economic blocs, the European 
Community and the Comecon. This division strengthened the barrier 
function of the borders between the blocs, but encouraged the economic 
relations between the states within them. With the end of the Cold War, the 
former countries of the eastern bloc opened their borders in order to join in 
the economic integration of Western Europe. The socio-economic rift could 
now be overcome. Both the military and economic functions of European 
borders, thus, changed immediately after the collapse of socialism. 
Another function of the borders is a cultural one. Particularly after World 
War I, it became a principle to draw new borders along lines of nationality. 
Therefore, state borders became cultural ones. In general, it was the aim of 
a state to homogenize its population in order to strengthen the identity of 
the state, for instance by making available a standard national language and 
national history. Especially education and media were used in this process. 
One adverse effect of this policy has been the deepening of cultural 
differences on both sides of state’s boundaries.
24 
A last function of the state is the provision of a welfare state. It is a moral 
obligation for every state to look after its people. In this context, state 
borders are to define a national society, a cohesive social grouping. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that people on both sides of the Cold War 
border developed quite different sociological patterns.
25 
Borders in the European Union 
In the 21
st century we are confronted with a very interesting phenomenon in 
Europe. While the borders in the European Union  have lost their 
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  41importance, in Central and Eastern Europe new state borders have been 
established. The internal borders of the European Union lose significance 
on a daily basis. At the same time, the external borders of the European 
Union are still moving, which means that the re-drawing of borders, 
especially in Eastern and Central Europe, is still ongoing.  
Internal borders of the European Union are those inside the European 
Union or between the member states, sometimes resembling a closed club. 
On the other hand, external borders are frontiers between the European 
Union and non-EU countries. There are three main external border regions 
of the Union: 
1.  regions bordering EFTA countries, some of which have joined the    
            Union; 
2.  regions bordering Eastern and Central Europe; 
3.  regions on the Union’s southern frontiers, including Turkey and      
            North Africa.
26 
Within the European Union, most of the border controls have been 
abolished as a consequence of the Schengen Agreement. In this agreement, 
named after a small town in Luxembourg, signed on the 14
th of June 1985, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands agreed in 
principle that they would gradually remove their common border controls 
and introduce freedom of movement for all individuals who are nationals of 
the signatory member states, other member states or third countries.  
The first step towards the Schengen Agreement was the Saarbrücken 
Agreement of 1984 between France and Germany, with a twofold purpose: 
“to make substantial progress towards the achievement of the so-called 
‘citizens’ Europe’ on a limited scale and, at the same time, to set an 
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  42example for the European integration process.”
27 Soon, the Benelux 
countries displayed an interest in joining France and Germany. The 
Schengen Agreement was signed by the above five states on the 19
th of 
June 1990 and entered into force on the 26
th of March 1995. It lays down 
the arrangements and guarantees for implementing freedom of movement. 
It amends the relevant national laws and is subject to parliamentary 
ratification. Italy (1990), Spain and Portugal (1991), Greece (1992), Austria 
(1995), Sweden, Finland and Denmark (1996) have since joined the list of 
signatories, while Iceland and Norway are also parties to the Agreement.
28 
One of the reasons why the United Kingdom and Ireland do not accept the 
Schengen Agreement is the fact that they have a different view on how far 
the “free movement of persons” should go. Furthermore, it is well known 
that the United Kingdom displays a certain distrust of the manner in which 
some Schengen contracting parties carry out immigration controls. One of 
the main problems is that of illegal immigration into the Schengen territory, 
which is often called “Schengenland”.
29 This illegal immigration will prove 
very problematic for the European Union if controls at the external borders 
of the European Union are not carried out strictly. 
With the launch of the Single Market in January 1993, the European Union 
introduced three of the four freedoms according to Article 7a of the Treaty 
on European Union. The free movement of goods, capital and services has 
been introduced but the fourth freedom, that of persons, remained to be 
realized due to fears of terrorism, drugs and illegal immigration from 
central Europe and Northern Africa.
30 
Nevertheless, the Schengen Agreement and the abolition of internal border 
controls do not mean that all controls are necessarily eliminated. With the 
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  43Schengen Agreement the border controls are merely transferred from the 
internal to the external borders of the European Union. However, Schengen 
also signifies a better cooperation between the participating states. This is 
especially the case with respect to the prevention of illegal immigration 
into the Schengen territory, the improvement of police and judicial 
cooperation, the harmonization of visa and immigration policies and of 
legislation on the control of illegal trafficking of narcotics and firearms, 
and the transfer of controls on the transport of goods from the borders to 
the interior of the Schengen territory.
31  
Schengen was a purely intergovernmental initiative without any significant 
participation of the Community institutions. After the negotiations 
commenced, some representatives from the Commission were invited to 
attend the meetings of the Schengen Central Negotiating Group and of the 
Ministers and the Under-Secretaries of State. Although the representatives 
of the Commission participated in the meetings, they played a marginal 
role. They took part in these meetings just as observers, without having the 
possibility of participating in the discussions or influencing the direction of 
the debates.
32 This state of affairs changed with the Treaty of Amsterdam 
coming into force. The Treaty incorporated the “Schengen acquis” into the 
European Union acquis from 1 May 1999 onwards, since it relates to one of 
the main objectives of the single market, namely the free movement of 
persons.
33 For that purpose, the Council of Ministers first of all identified 
the measures, which formed the real Schengen acquis. According to that, in 
order to give them a legal basis, it established whether they came under the 
new Title IV (visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the 
free movement of persons) or Title VI (provisions on police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters) of the Treaty on the European Union. 
After some discussion, the legal incorporation of Schengen into the 
European Union was accompanied by an integration of the institutions. The 
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  44Council took over the Schengen Executive Committee and the Council’s 
General Secretariat the Schengen Secretariat.
34  
The ultimate aim of the Schengen Agreement is to remove the last 
impediments for achieving free movement across internal borders. In 
accordance with Article 2 of the Schengen Implementing Convention, 
internal borders may be crossed at any point without any checks on persons 
being carried out. However, an exception can be made when public policy 
or national security so require. In such a case, a contracting party may 
decide that, for a limited period of time, national border controls will be 
reinstalled.
35  
In accordance with Article 5 of the Implementing Convention, contracting 
parties may grant entry into their territories for visits not exceeding three 
months to aliens who fulfill the following conditions: being in the 
possession of a valid document or documents and a valid visa if so 
required, having sufficient means of support, not being reported as a person 
not to be permitted entry and not being considered as a person to be a threat 
to public order, national security or the international relations of any of the 
contracting parties.
36 
Nevertheless, to fulfil those conditions does not necessarily permit an entry 
into Schengen territory. The conditions of Article 5 are just minimum 
standards. Therefore, contracting parties have the possibility of imposing 
other or stricter conditions for entry into their territories at any time. On the 
other hand, an entry into Schengen territory has to be refused if an alien 
does not fulfill the conditions of Article 5. The task of enforcing the 
conditions by the controlling state becomes ever more an extremely 
important function because the controlling state is regarded as the 
watchdog for all the Schengen members. This is due to the fact that the 
controlling state is forced to check the conditions of Article 5 in each 
Schengen state individually.
37 If an alien at the Schengen border is regarded 
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  45as non-acceptable in one of the Schengen contracting parties, he no longer 
fulfils the conditions of Article 5. Therefore, in practice, the following rule 
applies: the most restrictive standard applied by one of the contracting 
parties becomes the common standard. 
A last point concerning the Schengen Agreement pertains to visa policy. 
The aim of the contracting parties is to harmonies their individual policies 
by common agreement. For instance, a uniform Schengen visa has been 
introduced which is valid for the entire Schengen territory. An alien who 
wishes to enter the Schengen territory requires only one visa to travel 
through the whole Schengen area. As a result, the alien only has to cross 
the external border once.
38 
Nevertheless, there are some deficits concerning the visa arrangements. 
The Schengen system sets out three lists of countries regarding the issuing 
of visas. First, the Schengen contracting parties agreed on a list of third 
countries, whose nationals are subject to visa requirements common to all 
the contracting parties (the so-called negative list). Secondly, there is a list 
of countries whose nationals do not need a visa to enter the Schengen 
territory (the so-called positive list). A third list contains those countries on 
which the Schengen contracting parties could not reach an agreement as to 
visa requirements (the so-called grey list).
39 
A very interesting situation exists within the Schengen territory. There are 
some Schengen states who do require a visa from some countries, while 
others have abolished visa requirements for them. Today, the Schengen 
territory includes 15 states and it provides 326 million inhabitants freedom 
of movement in an area the size of India. Nevertheless, not all EU members 
are at the same time members of the Schengen Agreement. Great Britain 
and Ireland have opted against being included in this project of a Europe 
without borders. 
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  46Enlargement of the European Union 
Since its inception, the European Union has been confronted with four 
enlargement processes. The first one took place in 1973, when the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland joined the EC. This first enlargement has 
also been called the “Northern enlargement”. The second enlargement 
process was the “Southern enlargement”, which consisted of two rounds. 
The first brought about the membership of Greece in 1981. The second 
part, also known as the third enlargement round, took place in 1986 with 
the membership of Spain and Portugal. The fourth enlargement took place 
in 1995 when Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the EU. 
Each enlargement round up to now consisted of no more than three 
candidates. However, nowadays the European Union is confronted with an 
accession perspective of 13 candidates. “Never before”, argues Fraser 
Cameron, “had the Union envisaged an enlargement of such dimensions – 
it could add more than a 100 million to its population of 370 million – and 
in terms of the different economic and social situation involved.”
40 
Although not all 13 candidates will become members at the same time, the 
European Union had to negotiate with all of them simultaneously. This 
raises the question of why so many countries are now interested in the 
European Union. Until 1989 the Eastern European countries did not have 
the opportunity to take part in the process of European integration. 
However, the situation has changed since 1989 and the transformation 
process in Central and Eastern Europe has brought these countries to the 
stage where they have all applied for EU membership.
41 The European 
Union now finds itself in the difficult situation of not wanting to exclude 
anybody but at the same time not wishing to foster unrealistic expectations 
concerning the date of accession. The enlargement process must not be 
advanced too rapidly because there is not enough support for the entire 
 
40  Fraser Cameron, The European Union and the Challenge of Enlargement, in: Marc 
Maresceau (ed.), Enlarging the European Union. Relations between the EU and 
Central and Eastern Europe, New York 1997, p. 241. 
41 Ibid. 
  47enlargement among the European population. In early 2002, 50 per cent of 
the EU citizens were in favor of Eastern enlargement whereas 30 per cent 
opposed it.
42 Looking at the figures of the Eurobarometer, we can see that 
there is not only support for enlargement but also a good deal of 
opposition. Only a potential membership of Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, 
Malta and Hungary are supported by 50 per cent or more of the EU 
population. The other 12 candidates are supported by 34 to 47 per cent of 
the European population.
43 
In the years to come, this enlargement will pose a multitude of challenges 
to the European Union as well as opportunities and benefits for both sides. 
Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy of the European Union, considers the enlargement a highly 
significant process: 
”Firstly, an enlarged Union can only help strengthen the stability of the 
continent of Europe. A Europe which was founded on peace and reconciliation 
is seeking to expand to many of the countries which were for so long regarded 
by many as potential adversaries. Secondly, the Union’s founding principles 
(...) provide a sure guarantee against any undermining of democracy or basic 
freedoms (...) The principles of course themselves contribute to stability and 
security for individuals and societies. Thirdly, enlargement will provide huge 
economic opportunities for both existing and new Member States. The 
accession process places a huge burden on the accession countries. This is 
frequently not fully appreciated by those outside Europe who tend to see 
enlargement simply as a political decision.”
44 
Comparing the costs and benefits of the accession process, we have to 
acknowledge that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages. The 
disadvantages and challenges of enlargement can be regarded as the 
following: the cost of taking in poorer members and the difficulty of 
reforming Union policies.
45  
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  48Nevertheless, the enlargement process will bring many benefits to the 
European Union. It will 
- ”support the newly liberalized market economies by further opening up 
markets in goods and services between East and West, North and South, 
stimulating economic growth in Europe and offering new trading 
opportunities for all;  
- bind the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into Western European 
political and economic structures and thus enhance security and stability; 
both the US (and Russia) support enlargement for this reason; 
- increase effective cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs, 
helping to fight crime and the menace of drugs, the effects of which are 
felt throughout our continent ...”
46 
The enlargement process is particularly salient for the countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe. During the Cold War, relations between the European 
Union and these countries were minimal. This situation changed drastically 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, when dialogue and 
cooperation commenced between the two parts of Europe. After the Cold 
War, the European Union possessed a mystical attraction for the countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe. However, this attractiveness did not 
suddenly spring up after the end of the Cold War. Up until 1989, the 
perception of the European Community in the countries of the Eastern bloc 
was some kind of combination of myths, stereotypes, anxieties and hopes. 
On this basis the reaction of 1989/90 has to be understood: 
”There was considerable optimism concerning the prospects for an imminent 
return to Europe, and early EC membership became a central policy priority of 
the new CEEC governments. At this time the significance of the idea of 
rejoining Europe was very great. It denoted not only a desire for increased 
economic well-being, but provided a set of ideas and aspirations to fill the 
political and ideological vacuum created by the demise of the Soviet system.”
47 
With the end of the Cold War, many Central and Eastern Europeans 
believed that the situation regarding restrictions on the movement of people 
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  49had taken a giant turn for the better. They regarded the end of communism 
with relief and believed that this new vision of a Europe “whole and free” 
would bring a complete freedom to travel. Although free movement is not 
the main reason for these countries’ wish to join the European Union, they 
expected to be granted this right upon accession.
48  
It was also a time of considerable new instability in Central and Eastern 
Europe, particularly in the Balkans, which gave more weight to the 
demands of the governments of Central and Eastern European countries 
that the European Union should do more to support the extremely difficult 
and painful process of transformation in the region. Yet this instability also 
reinforced fears that an early accession would run the risk of importing 
instability into the European Union.
49  
Apart from the fear of importing instability there is also a second fear in 
Brussels regarding a possible massive influx immigration of workers into 
the Union. Taking into account the fact that almost 10 per cent of the 
working population in the European Union are unemployed, a migration of 
workers from Central and Eastern European countries would prove 
problematic for the European Union. Migration from the candidate states is 
often regarded as a dangerous potential source of job losses in the present 
member states. During the 1990s, there has been only very little migration 
from the candidate countries to the European Union. 19 million foreign 
citizens are living within the European Union. Less than 5 per cent of them 
originate from the candidate countries. However, this varies from country 
to country:  
”Migration from the applicants has had a much greater impact on Austria than 
in any other EU member state. The number of people from Bulgaria, Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Romania employed in Austria 
totaled 43.300 in 1997 compared to 5.000 in 1981. The number of all 
foreigners legally employed in Austria doubled in the period from 1988 to 
1997 from 151.000 to almost 300.000.”
50 
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  50The growing number of illegal entries into the territory of the European 
Union exacerbates this problem. In Germany, between 25.000 and 28.000 
illegal entries are discovered at the external borders of Germany year for 
year. Since 1995, almost 100.000 illegal entries have been reported.
51  
The border policies of the European Union 
Following the latest enlargement round in 1995, the European Union now 
has almost 10.000 km of land frontier, and borders between member states 
account for some 60 per cent of this. Almost 10 per cent of the population 
in the European Union lives in border regions.
52 In Schengen territory 326 
million people from 15 counties have freedom of movement, which means 
that they can move freely within the internal borders of the Schengen 
territory. The question now arises as to what kind of a role the candidate 
countries, in particular in Southeastern Europe, play concerning the border 
question. Is it possible to integrate them into the process of Schengen? 
First of all it is clearly defined in the Implementing Convention Article 140 
that a preliminary condition for becoming a party to the Convention is 
membership of the European Union. Therefore, the accession of new 
members will create new potential signatories of the Schengen Agreement. 
With the Eastern enlargement the external borders of the European Union 
will expand to the East.
53 This will continue as the enlargement process 
proceeds. With the enlargement the EU territory will, thus, substantially 
increase. An internal market will be implemented within this border-less 
area.
54  
However, the Schengen Implementing Convention will not immediately 
enter into force for the new members. They will have to improve and 
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  51intensify the cooperation in the fields of police and law. The Eastern border 
of Poland and of some other candidate countries will become the European 
Union’s external border, which will have to satisfy the criteria of the 
Schengen Implementing Convention. It has to be the task of these countries 
to control their borders, to arrange for safety, and to develop and improve 
structures of cooperation. The European Union wants to protect itself 
against organized crime and illegal immigration at its borders. At the same 
time, no fortress-like borders should be established. Between border 
regions, communication and trade will have to be improved and 
cooperation promoted.
55  
The fact that the external borders of the European Union will move 
eastwards with the enlargement taking place has motivated the Union to 
adapt itself to the new situation. The following two serve as examples. On 
the 29
th of March 1991 the European Union and Poland signed the 
Agreement on readmission of persons in an irregular position. After the 
Cold War, Poland was becoming ever more of a transit country for 
clandestine migration towards the Schengen territory. The European Union 
and especially the Schengen contracting parties were very concerned about 
this situation. Therefore, this Agreement with Poland was a very important 
first step in a new direction. However, one main consequence of this 
Agreement was that the burden of migration was shifted towards the 
Eastern borders of the Schengen territory. Nevertheless, it is apparent that 
the Agreement with Poland places the heaviest burden on the Polish border 
authorities as the readmission obligation will in most cases be imposed on 
Poland.
56 This is also the reason why Poland is called the “frontier guard” 
of the Schengen territory: 
”Nevertheless, Poland must take up its readmission responsibility towards any 
person who fails to meet the conditions for entry to the Schengen territory. An 
asylum seeker whose application for asylum has been rejected in the Schengen 
territory is after this rejection no longer an asylum seeker but a person who 
does not fulfill the entry conditions. Consequently, Poland will be obliged to 
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  52take this person (the former asylum seeker) back if he or she entered the 
Schengen territory through the Polish borders. In order to avoid this 
eventuality, Poland will most likely only allow those persons to cross the 
border who fulfill all the entry conditions.”
57 
Other Central and East European countries can also decide to join the 
agreement on readmission of persons in an irregular position with the 
Schengen states. This is possible under Article 7 of the Schengen 
Agreement. In this way, an effective “cordon sanitaire” is established 
around the Schengen territory. Those countries who will sign such an 
agreement will then be held responsible for entries into the Schengen 
territory through its Eastern borders by persons who do not fulfill the 
cumulative Schengen conditions.
58 
The second example concerning the European Union’s changing policy 
towards the countries in Central and Eastern Europe is the Visa Regulation 
number 539/2001. From 10
th of April, 2001, Bulgarian citizens may enter 
the Schengen countries and stay up to 90 days during a six month period 
under the condition that they have sufficient means to support themselves 
during the stay and that they have not previously been deported and 
prohibited to re-enter the Schengen countries.
59 Bulgaria also acts as the 
frontier guard of the Schengen territory in the east. The European Union 
has not yet signed a readmission agreement with Bulgaria but due to the 
geographical position of Bulgaria it is only a matter of time until such an 
agreement is signed. As long as the negotiations with Turkey have not 
commenced, Bulgaria will have to play the role of the frontier guard. 
Bulgaria has a function comparable to Poland. 
The Schengen countries invest considerable financial resources in the 
security of the external borders. That applies in particular to Germany and 
Austria bordering on Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.
60  
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  53Since the abolition of the internal borders within the European Union, 
Brussels has tried to introduce new programmes and policies to improve 
the economic situation of the Central and East European countries and in 
particular the border regions. Within this framework, the European Union 
first established the PHARE programme in 1989. Its original meaning lies 
in providing aid for reconstructing the economies of Poland and Hungary. 
Meanwhile, it extends to 13 Central and Eastern European countries 
(Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). For the period from 1995 to 
1999, funding under the PHARE programme totaled roughly 6.7 billion 
Euro and covered 15 sectors. Amongst others these include: infrastructure 
(energy, transport, telecommunication), development of the private sector 
and assistance for business, education, training and research, environmental 
protection and nuclear safety, and agricultural restructuring. At the same 
time, PHARE is, besides ISPA and SAPARD, the main financial 
instrument of the pre-accession strategy for the ten Central and Eastern 
European countries that have applied for membership in the European 
Union. Since 1994, PHARE’s tasks have been adapted to the priorities and 
needs of each Central and Eastern European country. The revamped 
programme, with a budget of over 10 billion Euro for the period from 2000 
to 2006, now has two specific priorities, namely institutional construction 
and financing investments. Following the proposals put forward by the 
Commission in its Agenda 2000 communication in July 1997, new forms 
of pre-accession aid have been added to the programme. These are 
structural measures to bring the level of environmental protection and 
transport infrastructure development in the applicant countries to that of the 
European Union and aid to agriculture.
61 
Cross-border cooperation is another task of PHARE. In 1994 it was 
endowed with 150 million Euro, with 169 million Euros in 1995 and 180 
million Euro being budgeted for the following years. The total for the 
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  54period from 1994 to 1999 was about 900 million Euro.
62 The PHARE 
programme can be understood as trying to promote and improve 
cooperation, especially between the former socialist countries: 
”The aim is to get regions to co-operate which for decades have been locked in 
a sullen historical antagonism, which found little expression during the years of 
official ‘socialist brotherhood’. A legacy of distrust and resentment has to give 
way to a genuine commitment to close cooperation.”
63 
Within the framework of the PHARE programme, Albania, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are eligible for aid. The 
programme provides help in different fields such as:  
- infrastructural  improvements 
-  common waste management projects 
-  the promotion of tourism 
- rural  development  measures 
- health  cooperation 
-  support for media disseminating cross-border information.
64 
Another programme of the European Union in particular concerning the 
border regions is the INTERREG programme. INTERREG is especially 
designed to end isolation and to develop cross-border cooperation. 
However, it aims to do this not only within the European Union but also 
across its external borders. The INTERREG programmes commenced in 
1990 with Interreg I between 1990 and 1994. The second programme was 
launched in 1994 and ran until 1999. The current INTERREG programme, 
INTERREG III, started in 2000 and will run until 2006. The main aim of 
INTERREG is to develop cross-border cooperation at both the internal and 
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  55the external borders of the European Union.
65 INTERREG I started in July 
1990 with four aims defined by the Commission: 
-  “helping areas on the Community’s external and internal borders to 
overcome development problems linked to their remoteness from the 
centers of national economic activity 
- encourage the development of cross-border cooperation networks 
- help the Community’s border areas with non-member states adjust to their 
role as border regions of the single market 
- co-operate with non-member countries on the EU’s external border.”
66 
The Commission itself has adequately described the challenge ahead: 
”The overall aim of the Interreg initiatives has been, and remains, that national 
borders should not be a barrier to the balanced development and integration of 
the European territory. The isolation of border areas has been of a double 
nature: on the one hand, the presence of borders cuts off border communities 
from each other economically, socially and culturally and hinders the coherent 
management of eco-systems; on the other, border areas have often been 
neglected under national policy, with the result that their economies have 
tended to become peripheral within national boundaries. The single market and 
EMU are strong catalysts for changing this situation. Nevertheless, the scope 
for strengthening cooperation to the mutual advantage of border areas 
throughout the Community remains enormous. The challenge is all the greater 
when the future enlargement of the Community is considered, as this will 
increase  the number of its internal borders and, progressively, shift the 
Community’s external borders eastwards.”
67 
In this framework, the INTERREG III programme considers its task to be 
the strengthening of economic and social cohesion in the Community by 
promoting cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation as well 
as balanced development of the European Union territory. INTERREG III 
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  56pays attention to the borders and border areas between member states and 
between the European Union and third countries. Attention is focused on: 
-  the external borders of the European Union, in particular with respect 
to enlargement, 
-  cooperation concerning the outermost regions of the European 
Union, 
-  cooperation to further the peace process begun in the Balkans, 
-  cooperation concerning insular regions.
68  
Regarding the primary topics of Interreg III we can discern the following: 
-  promoting urban, rural and coastal development, 
- encouraging  entrepreneurship  and the development of small firms 
and local employment initiatives, 
-  promoting the integration of the labor market and social inclusion, 
-  sharing human resources and facilities of research, technological 
development, education, culture, communications and health to 
increase productivity and help create sustainable jobs, 
-  encouraging the protection of the environment, local and global, 
increasing energy efficiency and promoting renewable sources of 
energy, 
-  improving transport, information and communication networks and 
services as well as water and energy systems, 
-  developing cooperation in the legal and administrative spheres to 
promote economic development and social cohesion, 
-  increasing human and institutional potential for cross-border 
cooperation to promote economic development and social 
cohesion.
69 
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  57Since 1989, various cross-border regions have been developed with the 
help of cross-border projects. The Central and East European countries 
have not put so much effort into the question of border management and 
control. These countries obviously have more pressing matters to deal 
with.
70 Continuously, the EU is pressing the candidate countries to do more 
in this respect. 
Especially within PHARE and INTERREG, many cross-border 
cooperations have been created, such as between Bulgaria and Greece, the 
Czech Republic and Germany, the Czech Republic and Austria, Hungary 
and Austria, Poland and Germany, Slovakia and Austria, Slovenia and 
Italy, and Slovenia and Austria. Regarding the funds for these projects, one 
should point out that all the projects are co-financed by the relevant 
bordering state, their contribution being met by the European Union’s 
PHAND cross-border cooperation fund.
71 
In this respect, Austria provides a good example. When Austria joined the 
European Union in 1995 it did so with a unique set of geographical 
boundaries. Austria shares borders with five non-European Union 
countries, four of those in Central Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Slovenia). Therefore, Austria is also called the gateway to the 
West.
72 Within the cross-border projects of Austria, 40 per cent of aid will 
be spent on promoting economic cooperation, 31 per cent on developing 
new or existing infrastructure and the remainder on labor training and 
conservation.  
Central and East European countries having common borders with 
European Union member countries profit from the aim of the EU member 
states concerning their external borders, which is to assist the common 
border areas adjust to European Union status. With the funds of the 
European Union and the relevant bordering state, Central and East 
European countries have the opportunity to modernize their borders and to 
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  58bring them up to European standard. The German government, for instance, 
provided only up to 1999 40 million Euro to the Polish police and 30 
million Euro to the Czech police to improve border control.
73 Countries 
bordering the European Union were confronted with problems such as 
illegal migration and asylum: 
”They have to face the fact that many asylum-seekers are on their way to West 
European states and see Central Europe as a transit region. Central European 
states are pressured by their EU counterparts – especially those EU states 
which receive the majority of refugees such as Germany, the United Kingdom 
but also neighboring states such as Austria – to control migration and 
implement the very same restrictive measures that have been applied in 
Western Europe.”
74 
The perception of borders in Southeastern Europe 
While the importance of borders in Western Europe has declined and most 
of the borders within the European Union have been abolished, the 
situation in South-Eastern Europe is the opposite. Rudolf Joo, a leader of 
the Hungarian opposition remarks that: ”While borders are coming down 
throughout Western Europe, here they’re going up.”
75 The perception of 
borders in Southeastern Europe is not the same as in Western Europe. The 
ones in Western Europe lost their controlling function. Especially within 
the Schengen territory the abolition of internal border controls marks a 
significant acknowledgement of the weakening of infrastructural power of 
the nation state.
76 However, in Southeastern Europe the situation is quite 
different. In this region, nationalism plays a very important role, 
particularly between neighboring countries. Borders in Southeastern 
Europe signify that this country takes great pride in owning this territory. 
Borders in this region induce a feeling of nationalism, especially in the 
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  59border areas. Andrew Purvis, a journalist writing for “Time” magazine who 
traveled through Southeastern Europe remarked: 
”In conversations along the way I found that abstractions about a new 
borderless Europe seemed remote, while nationalism was alive and well – 
especially in the frontier areas where I spent most of my time.”
77 
The conflicts and wars in Southeastern Europe of centuries past are the 
reason that in this region hate and distrust are feelings which are still alive 
in the 21
st century. The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 also had a 
significant impact on the countries involved due to the resulting post-war 
border changes. In 1912, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia 
declared war on the Ottoman Empire and stripped it of most of its 
remaining European possessions. The second Balkan War in 1913 was also 
fought over national boundaries. Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece, 
leading to an invasion and partial dismemberment of Bulgaria by its former 
Balkan allies and Turkey.
78 
Nowadays there are still lingering territorial and border issues which hinder 
reconciliation.
79 First of all there is the “Croatian question”. This is focused 
on the relation of Croatia to the Croats living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
During the Franjo Tudjman government (1990-1999), the support of the 
Croats living in Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the main concerns of 
Zagreb. In fact, Tudjman’s policy came down to the attempted binding to 
the motherland of the parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina dominated by 
Croatians, based on historical claims. However, after Tudjman’s death in 
December 1999, the new President Stjepan Mesic and the new Prime 
Minister Ivica Racan have significantly reduced the support to Croatians in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. They began concentrating on the stabilization of 
the neighboring country. 
The second question is the Bosnian one, which is concerned with the actual 
statehood (as opposed to formal) of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, it 
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  60is a fact that many Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs are not interested in a 
functioning statehood. Rather, they are interested in special relations with 
their actual titular states. Regardless of the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is thrice divided according to multiple criteria including the 
army and the monetary system. A three-part division of the country is 
discussed with increasing frequency. It is impossible to ascertain how the 
territorial future of Bosnia and Herzegovina will develop but it is clear that 
three nations and three states are involved in this process.  
The third question concerns the “Serbia question”. Historically, many Serbs 
were interested since the 19
th century in uniting the scattered Serb 
settlement areas all over the “western Balkans”. These areas are located in 
Banat, in the Batshka, in Syrmia, Slavonia, in the Krajina, in Bosnia and 
Montenegro. Slobodan Milošević did not do everything to reach this aim of 
uniting the Serbs outside of Serbia under one territorial roof. The new 
leadership in Belgrade has not unambiguously up to now distanced itself 
from these aspirations and the legacy of the past decade. During the 1990s, 
however, the ethnostructural conditions experienced a fundamental shift. 
The number of Serbs outside of Serbia dropped considerably. Almost 
570.000 refugees came to Serbia from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Kosovo. No matter how Serbia will continue its policy towards 
neighboring countries, many nations and their people will feel the 
repercussions.  
The fourth question is focused on Montenegro. The arguments around the 
independence of Montenegro are primarily concerned with its relation to 
the Serbs and Serbia. Beyond that, two ethnic groups in Montenegro are 
also involved in this question, namely the Albanians, making up 6.6 per 
cent of the population in 1991, and the Muslims, representing 14.6 per cent 
of the population at the same time. These two ethnic groups partly live in 
the Sandzak Novi Pazar, which is divided between Serbia and Montenegro. 
Therefore, the future status of Montenegro touches the interests of Serbia, 
Albania and also Macedonia.  
The fifth question in this region is the perennial “Macedonian question”. 
With respect to this a thorough modification occurred in the 1990s. After 
  612001, it is obvious that the stability of the Republic of Macedonia is 
endangered not primarily by external but by internal factors. In Macedonia, 
there is a problematic relationship between Slavonic and Albanian 
Macedonians (between 25 and 30 per cent of the population). In particular 
the developments in Kosovo have exacerbated the ethnic division in 
Macedonian society.  
The Macedonian question is, however, closely connected with the 
“Albanian question”. Similarly, as in the case of the Serbs, many Albanians 
live outside of Albania. Most of them live in Kosovo, in the West and 
Northwest of Macedonia, in the South of Montenegro, and in the Northwest 
of Greece. Governing representatives avoid speaking of a unification of all 
settlement areas into a state but aspirations once in a while surface. The 
relationship between Albania and the Albanians living outside the borders 
has improved, especially after the change of the regime in Serbia. It is 
obvious that Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro will be influenced by 
future developments of the Albanian question, also concerning the future 
status of Kosovo.
80 
None of the above mentioned territorial issues can be solved to the 
complete satisfaction of all involved. Each solution completely in favor of 
one side would cause substantial loss and disadvantage to several other 
groups and states. In this respect, it is not important to solve just one 
question but to find a cooperative solution between the countries involved. 
There are three options to handle these questions, namely sovereignty, self-
determination and a diplomacy that is interested in stable structures. 
Sovereignty and self-determination will have incalculable and, in the long 
run, uncontrollable conflicts as their consequence. Therefore, the third 
option seems most likely to adequately meet the challenges of this region.  
Within this third option we again have three aspects. First we have the 
internal bracket. This is a solution between the Balkan countries, namely 
some kind of a “Balkan Union” with a cooperative foreign policy, a 
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  62common market, a coordinated external trade policy and a consulted 
minority policy. The second aspect is the external bracket. Its foundation is 
supplied by the European Union and its firmness guarantees the adequate 
integration of the whole region into the European Union. The third aspect is 
a connection of the internal and external brackets, namely a cooperation 
between the Balkan countries with the support of the European Union. It 
seems that the third aspect is the most likely to bring stability to the 
region.
81 If economic recovery and the prospect of integration into the 
European Union do not materialize in the near future, an even stronger turn 
to nationalism will be anything but surprising. We have to face the fact that 
the words “enemy” and “nationalism” are still alive in Southeastern 
Europe.
82 
Comparing this situation with that of the neighboring countries in the 
European Union, we have to say that the countries in the European Union 
have left feelings such as hate, distrust and hostility behind themselves. 
Since the Second World War, the neighboring countries in Europe 
peacefully live together in the European Union, rather than in hostility, in 
trust, rather than distrust, in friendship, rather than hate. Perhaps we can 
take the end of the Cold War to be a new start in Southeastern Europe for 
better relations between neighboring countries. 
Now, some examples of borders and neighboring countries in Southeastern 
Europe might illuminate the scope of the challenges as well as the progress 
achieved. Romania and Hungary are two countries in this region belonging 
together for various reasons. Specifically, both of them are sharing a 
common border, both of them had to live under a socialist regime, and both 
of them are negotiating with the European Union on membership. 
However, there are also some differences. The Hungarians are Catholic 
whereas the Romanians are Orthodox. This difference seems to be very 
important. 
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  63”George Konrad … suggests that the old fault line dividing East and West is 
changing in character: it now divides the East and the West not of the Cold 
War but of Byzantium and Rome – Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats, of 
Orthodox Romanians and Catholic Hungarians.”
83 
Today, almost 2 million ethnic Hungarians live in Romania. These people 
are occupied with cross-border trade, exporting cheap Romanian goods to 
Hungary. Many of them engage in this trade illegally and they additionally 
find illegal employment in Hungary where the average wage is much 
higher.
84 Zsuzsa Bereschi, foreign affairs adviser to the president of the 
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, said: ”There are roughly 2 
million ethnic Hungarians in Romania – all of them have ties to the 
motherland and many depend on seasonal work in Hungary.”
85 As Hungary 
will probably join the European Union ahead of Romania, this fact creates 
considerable anxiety, concerning the free movement of people. At present, 
Romanian citizens (including ethnic Hungarians living in Romania) are 
able to travel to Hungary without a visa for up to 30 days. Hungary is 
interested in a visa free regime for all Romanians. Nevertheless, under 
pressure from the European Union, Hungary has to impose visas and 
control illegal migration at her borders. The Hungarian government has 
decided to grant various privileges as well as financial and material help to 
ethnic Hungarians living abroad. According to a survey carried out by 
Budapest’s Tarki Social Research Center, 56 per cent of Hungarians stated 
that ethnic Hungarian children should receive free state education, 53 per 
cent affirmed that ethnic Hungarians should be granted health benefits and 
services, and 32 per cent hold the opinion that ethnic Hungarians should be 
able to settle in Hungary without any restrictions.
86 Jonathan Stein, a 
Prague-based political analyst, points out: 
”Imagine that Hungary receives aid from Brussels to build hospitals ....The 
country’s health care system improves dramatically and the government says, 
‘We are willing to share but only with our ethnic Hungarian neighbors, not 
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  64with our Slovak or Romanian neighbors.’ That can cause real problems ... The 
EU will say, ‘You can’t favor one group of Romanian citizens over another.”
87 
The ethnic and religious diversity between Hungarians and Romanians, 
which dates back to the break-up of the Habsburg Empire, threatens the 
relationship between Hungary and Romania. The Hungarian Rudolph Joo 
of the opposition group “Democratic Forum” has gone as far as 
proclaiming: ”If there are to be pogroms in Romania, this time they will be 
against the Hungarians rather than the Jews.”
88  
Nevertheless, Hungary is interested in cross-border cooperation with its 
neighboring countries due to the fact that disparities will cause turbulence 
and worse. However, in the final analysis Hungary’s relationship with its 
neighboring countries can be positively evaluated. Michael Lake, 
ambassador and head of the delegation of the European Commission in 
Hungary, holds the opinion that the region will gradually become more 
integrated, just as it was under the Austro-Hungarian Empire up until 
1918.
89 This will allay some of the problems. 
The second example is Poland and its borders to the East. Like Hungary, 
Poland also has a large diaspora in neighboring countries. More than 
600.000 ethnic Poles live in Belarus and Ukraine and 300.000 Belorussians 
and Ukrainians live in Poland. European Union enlargement will transform 
Russia, Ukraine, the Caucasus and the Middle East into immediate 
neighbors of the EU. With respect to this, Poland plays an important role 
for the European Union neighborhood policy. The ties between Poland, 
Ukraine, and Lithuania are centuries old and minorities in border regions 
have further strengthened these links.
90 The fact that a large number of 
ethnic Poles live in Belarus and Ukraine, while at the same time 
Belorussians and Ukrainians live in Poland, creates a problem for Poland’s 
border policy. People living in Ukraine and Belarus make money bringing 
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  65cheap alcohol and tobacco into Poland, where they buy consumer goods 
such as textiles, detergent and cosmetics to take home. Therefore, Poland is 
of the opinion that it is important for the European Union to remain open to 
countries like Ukraine, even though they have practically no prospect of 
membership in the foreseeable future. Witold Orlowski, director of the 
Independent Center for Economic Studies in Lodz, argues: 
”Ukraine is important not because we believe that the welfare of Poland 
depends on trade with Ukraine ... But if Ukrainians feel they are denied access 
to the rich part of Europe, it may have a negative impact on their development. 
If we want Ukrainians to see the market economy and democracy, it’s better to 
let them visit and not create obstacles.”
91 
The third example is Slovenia and its border policy. Slovenia shares 
borders with two European Union countries, namely Austria and Italy, as 
well as Hungary and Croatia. In today’s Slovenia, one can find two 
different border policies. First there are the borders to Western and Central 
Europe, which are open. On the other side, we have the border to Croatia, 
which is just being fortified. On the one hand, free trade agreements with 
the Visegrad countries are concluded, while on the other hand new barriers 
are cropping up in trade with Croatia.
92 The new border agreement between 
Slovenia and Croatia, pending ratification, might be able to resolve many 
of the problems arising. 
In addition, in Austria, Italy, and Hungary there are Slovenian minorities, 
which are undergoing rapid assimilation. This was especially the case when 
the borders were closed. However, with their opening, the minorities 
acquired a new role, namely that of a mediating link between two language 
areas. Expanding cross-border trade has increased the need for German-
Slovene and Italian-Slovene communication. Thus, the opening of the 
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  66borders has resulted in the strengthening of the roles of minority 
languages.
93 Another aspect is that the business interests incline to not just 
tolerate but even learn the language of neighbors. 
Although the Slovenes have always nursed a fear of dominating influences 
from abroad, they opened their borders. This signifies changing Slovenian 
attitudes because the opening of borders could lead to a loss of identity, 
especially in border areas. In this respect, the Slovenian attitude concerning 
borders is not too dissimilar from the European Union’s. Public opinion 
surveys made in Slovenia between 1991 and 1994 clearly showed a trend 
of declining acceptability of immigrants from former Yugoslav republics.
94 
Furthermore, Slovenians hold the opinion that mass immigration will be 
accompanied by probable negative effects: 
-  the crime rate will increase greatly (85 per cent of the respondents) 
-  conflicts between native born and immigrants will increase (83   
          percent) 
-  unemployment of native residents will worsen (83 per cent) 
-  worsening of housing situation (availability, price) (82 per cent) 
-  wages, working conditions will worsen (76 per cent) 
-  streets and railway stations will be dirty (65 per cent) 
-  gradually it will not feel like home (46 per cent) 
-  Slovene language will gradually be ousted (39 per cent).
95 
No difference is found when comparing the attitudes of Slovenians with 
those of European Union inhabitants concerning immigrants. The 
Slovenians share the same values and threats that the Europeans do. In this 
way, they argue, Slovenia belongs to Central Europe by virtue of both its 
geographical location as well as its cultural traditions.
96  
 
93  Ibid, p. 141. 
94  Ibid, p. 145. 
95  Ibid, p. 146. 
96  Ibid, p. 140. 
  67A fourth and last example is the border between Greece and Turkey. 
Nowadays, we can speak of a friendly relationship between Athens and 
Ankara but throughout history this was not always the case. Turkey and 
Greece are two neighbors with multiple historical problems. These 
problems have not been solved yet but a very important dialogue between 
the old enemies started at the end of the 1990s. Through this dialogue many 
problems could be solved. Perhaps this does not include the political ones, 
but rather the problems between the Greek and the Turkish population. 
Today, the relationship is improving and the words “enemy” and “hate” 
have all but disappeared from everyday language. Nevertheless, the borders 
between Turkey and Greece are for both countries the most important ones.  
The reasons for this state of affairs between the two countries are historical, 
with the past wars and conflicts being particularly salient.
97 The former US 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Henry Kissinger described the Turkish-Greek 
relationship as based on one of the oldest, historical, hereditary enmities.
98 
The borders between the two countries were always prepared for a possible 
conflict between Athens and Ankara. Therefore, it was not surprising to see 
an accumulation of soldiers on the borders. Particularly, when first signs of 
a conflict made themselves felt, troops were immediately stationed on both 
sides of the boundary. In the past, this situation occurred frequently. ”Not 
so long ago, these boundary waters and a few rocky outcroppings to the 
north brought NATO members Greece and Turkey to the brink of war.”
99 
Although we can now speak of a good relationship between Greece and 
Turkey, it is a fact that none of the political controversies between the two 
countries have been solved. The Cyprus problem, for instance, is still on 
the agenda of both countries: 
”Manned permanently by Turkish troops on one side, Greek Cypriot troops on 
the other, and U.N. peacekeepers in between, it is one of the most impenetrable 
boundaries on earth. Signs erected by nationalists and the Turkish military keep 
the memory of war alive. At the nearby Museum of Barbarism, gruesome 
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  68black-and-white photographs of mutilated children and a bathtub marked with 
the 37-year-old blood and brain tissue of a young family murdered by Greek 
insurgents memorialize Greek terror.”
100 
Greeks and Turks experience the same feelings of excitation and fear when 
crossing the border to the neighboring country. Traveling from Greece to 
Turkey and vice versa causes an unconscious fear. However, this fear will 
disappear in future because increasing numbers of Greeks come to Turkey 
and vice versa. Although the dialogue between Greeks and Turks is very 
important, it is just as important to solve the political problems between 
Greece and Turkey due to the fact that one can never know how long this 
period of relaxation will last. It is especially the Cyprus problem, which 
calls for a solution because the border on this island proves very 
problematic. As one outside visitor described the odd travel conditions: 
”I took the only route to southern Cyprus: I caught the Cyprus Turkish Airlines 
flight to Istanbul, spent the night, drove back to the airport for the early 
morning Olympic Airlines flight to Athens and just barely made my connection 
to Larnaca, in southern Cyprus, where I hailed a cab back to the green line in 
Nikosia .... Forty hours and 2.400 km later, I was 200 m from where I 
started.”
101 
All the four examples of borders in Southeastern Europe have shown that 
the borders in this region are charged with problems. Some of these will be 
solved when the countries concerned become members of the European 
Union but other border problems will continue. Therefore, it is important to 
improve cross-border cooperation in various fields. Another important step 
in this respect is the cooperation between the countries of Southeastern 
Europe themselves. Such cooperation commenced at the end of the 1990s 
with various projects, such as programs supporting the fight against 
organized crime, building infrastructural projects, developing traffic and 
 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
  69communication passages, pipelines and gas lines, as well as introducing 
confidence and security building measures.
102  
Regional cooperation between the countries of Southeastern Europe has 
just started. In this region, the opinion prevails that while regional 
cooperation is always desirable it should not be politically institutionalized. 
Some argue that the West wishes to structure Balkan cooperation as an 
alternative to EU entry. Therefore, the Balkan countries regard Balkan 
cooperation not as an end in itself but as a necessary intermediate step on 
the way into the European Union.
103 In this context, all regional initiatives 
which started after 1989/1990 had the aim of preparing their members for 
integration into the European Union. Various initiatives including countries 
of Southeastern Europe have been started, such as: 
-  the Central European Initiative (1989)  
-  the Central European Free Trade Area (1991) 
-  the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (1992) 
-  the Balladur Pact (1993) 
-  the Royaumont Process (1995) 
-  the Regional Approach of the EU (1995) 
-  the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (1996) 
-  the Southeast European Cooperation Process (1996) 
-  the Southeast European Defense Ministerials including the 
  Multinational Peace Force in Southeastern Europe (1997) 
-  the Stability Pact and the Stabilization and Association Process of 
  the EU (1999). 
Although cooperation in Southeastern Europe seems impressive, there are 
only few concrete results in the region. The reasons are not only diverging 
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  70national interests, rivalries, and conflicts still existing in this region. In 
addition, there is the competitive behavior of external actors, frequently 
motivated by economic self-interest, who urge an improvement of 
Southeast European cooperation.
104 We can see that at the beginning of the 
21
st century the domestic and intergovernmental instabilities in the region 
have still not been eliminated. Large ethno-political conflicts and questions 
remain virulent around Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Kosovo, 
where the “Albanian question” has serious implications for the whole 
geopolitical architecture in the Southern Balkans. 
Conclusion 
The European borders, especially those in the European Union, are still of 
great importance, in all respects. Apart from the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, every member of the European Union has joined the Schengen 
agreement. With the Eastern enlargement the European Union will get new 
neighbors with Russia, Ukraine, in the Caucasus and the Middle East. This 
enlargement will present the European Union with a multitude of 
challenges, especially concerning its border policy. Within this context, the 
European Union has initiated border programmes due to the fact that the 
European Union has an interest in efficient, safe, and modern border 
controls, which meet the stringent Schengen standards in terms of technical 
equipment, procedures and man power.
105 Furthermore, the European 
Union recognizes the importance of cross-border cooperation and therefore 
promotes a multitude of projects in Southeastern Europe. One main policy 
goal of Brussels regards the political stability and economic growth of the 
whole continent. Therefore, the new borders of the European Union must 
not and will not be a new dividing line, which restricts prosperity and 
stability to the EU side. Romano Prodi describes the European Union’s 
policy as follows: 
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  71”We will not let a new ‘iron curtain‘ be built between the Union and its 
neighbors ... In future, our neighborhood policy should be directed at creating a 
single strategic partnership with all the regions on our new borders ... For the 
first time in many centuries we have the opportunity to unite Europe on the 
basis of shared ideals and common goals.”
106 
Both the European Union and the candidate countries express an interest in 
a new Europe, a Europe without borders. However, a Europe without 
borders can only be successful on the condition that all members and 
candidates of the European Union accept the EU’s border standards. The 
candidate countries still have a long way to go before they reach the 
standards of the Schengen Agreement.  
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  72Didactical questions  
The topic of borders has become highly controversial in Europe following 
the demise of communism. The trends are contradicting and divergent, the 
views on the future significance of borders as well. 
Thus, first of all we have to deal with the question concerning the impor-
tance of borders in Europe and their functions. Do borders in Europe sepa-
rate people from each other or do they connect them? What is the percep-
tion of borders in Southeastern Europe? If there indeed is a difference in 
the perceptions between Western and Southeastern Europe. What exactly is 
the difference? Where does it come from and what can be done to over-
come these differences? 
During the Cold War an “ideological border” between the two blocs ex-
isted. Furthermore, during this period borders in Europe were highly stable. 
In contrast, the period following 1989 was marked by multiple transforma-
tions of European borders. With respect to this, it might be useful to con-
sider the salience and function of ideological boundaries. 
Analysing the function of borders, we will be confronted with their reli-
gious, cultural, economic and political functions. Particularly the religious 
function of borders has achieved new significance nowadays. Do borders in 
this century play an important role between Islam and Christianity as well 
as between Roman-Catholic and Orthodox Christians? Throughout history 
borders played a very important role between Islam and Christianity. It 
seems likely that we will encounter the same situation in future. However, 
time will show in which direction the relationship between Islam and 
Christianity will develop. 
The European Union has both internal and external borders. What is their 
future? Especially the external borders will cause many headaches for the 
European Union. What are the challenges? What can be done to overcome 
them? It is a fact that in the near future the countries in Southeastern 
Europe will move closer to the external borders of the European Union. 
Which implications can be foreseen?  
  73Another important issue is the Schengen Agreement. Does the agreement 
simplify the border questions? Additionally, is the Schengen Agreement 
likely to be a good solution for all the future members of the European Un-
ion? Will it help to find the right answers to the questions concerning bor-
ders? Will it prove to be feasible to integrate all of the candidate countries 
into the Schengen structure? 
It is a fact that the perception of borders in Southeastern Europe is not the 
same as in Western Europe. In Western Europe, boundaries between the 
countries are decreasing in importance.. For many people, borders have lost 
their traditional functions. However, in Southeastern Europe borders are 
highly salient for each single nation. In this region they still often serve 
rather nationalistic purposes. Why did the borders in Southeastern Europe 
not lose significance as in Western Europe? Is it possible to learn from the 
experience of Western Europe with respect to national boundaries?  
There is no doubt that the countries in South-Eastern Europe have to live 
with many conflicts. Therefore, it has to be the most important aim to re-
duce the conflicts between the countries in this region. With respect to this, 
we have to ask ourselves. Why are there so many conflicts in this region? 
What are the reasons for the conflicts in this century? It is high time that we 
find answers to those questions. Should it not prove possible to find ade-
quate answers it will be difficult to speak about dialogue and cooperation. 
What can be done to tackle the problems that are responsible for these con-
flicts? What can especially be done to increase the level of cooperation be-
tween the countries in this region further? What can the young generation 
in those countries do to initiate a dialogue for better understanding and a 
better perception of each other? 
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